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1 Introduction 
The discovery of single-event effects (SEE) 45 years ago presented radiation engineers with a 
new kind of threat [1].  SEE could occur with no warning at any time during the mission.  They 
could have consequences ranging from trivial to catastrophic.  Moreover, when they were 
discovered, the closest terrestrial analog to SEE occurred during nuclear tests—for all practical 
purposes, they were unique to the space environment.  Over the next several years, the radiation 
effects community developed effective methods for evaluating SEE risk.  Even the first paper on 
the discovery [1] discusses basic mechanisms and contains first attempts at rate estimation.  SEE 
test methods began to be developed soon after [2].  Protons were reported to cause single-event 
upset (SEU) by 1979 [3].  The Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) in 
1980 saw the first session devoted specifically to single-event phenomena, and soon, the 
alphabet soup of SEE modes included destructive effects [4-6].  Throughout the first two decades 
after the discovery of SEE, rate estimation methods underwent continual improvement [7], and 
by 1996, the basic infrastructure of SEE hardness assurance (SEE HA) was in place.   
     The process by which SEE HA developed followed the general approach of risk management.  
The threat(s) were identified—either by looking at on-orbit data or developing appropriate 
ground-based test methods.  The threat was evaluated by carrying out further testing, modeling 
the space environment and developing models of the basic SEE mechanisms to foster 
understanding.  Rate estimation models and improved test techniques were developed where 
possible to bound failure probabilities.  Ultimately, mitigation techniques were developed, 
exploiting understanding of the SEE mechanisms to increase hardness at the device, part, circuit 
or system level.  And for the most part, it has worked amazingly well. 
     At present, SEE HA faces new challenges, arising from new “risk tolerant” missions that still 
want a reasonable chance of success; from increased pressure to exploit commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technologies for their improved performance; from more complex parts and avionics 
architectures that complicate efforts to evaluate SEE threats; and from ever more stringent 
demands for lower costs and increased performance.   
     Whether they are called, SmallSats, Explorer class, Class D or any of a range of other terms, 
many new missions seek to avoid the high qualification and verification costs of satellite 
development by allowing higher tolerance of risk.  They can do this by flying in more benign 
radiation environments over shorter durations and decreasing the costs of the mission by 
launching as a secondary payload, by shortening design cycles, by minimizing testing and/or by 
use of less costly, higher-performance but riskier COTS parts.  Ideally, allowing designers to 
take more risks would lead to more missions, more innovation and more rapid evolution of 
satellite design.  Unfortunately, SEE stand as a significant obstacle to mission success and to 
trading risk tolerance for lower costs.  In benign radiation environments over short timescales, 
SEE may dominate radiation risk and in some cases the risk to mission success.   
     Use of COTS poses challenges in part because of the broad range of technologies, part types, 
manufacturers and quality encompassed by the term.  It may include technologies so soft that 
they upset due to direct ionization from protons [7], and it may include parts with exceptional 
radiation performance [8].  Moreover, the broad range of COTS choices available to designers 
means there is unlikely to be radiation data for any given part or even for similar parts, and the 
rapid cycle time for many COTS parts limits the time during which the data are valid.  Issues of 
die and lot traceability and lot uniformity raise questions as to whether test part performance will 
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be representative of flight parts.  And many COTS parts—often precisely the ones an engineer 
wants to use—are extremely complicated and difficult to test. 
     It is partly this increase in complexity in COTS parts that has placed more pressure on 
SEEHA to limit costs.  Not only will a part with many modes of operation take longer to test, the 
high speed and high pin count of the part will require more complicated and expensive test 
hardware to characterize its response to radiation.  Moreover, as SmallSats attempt to economize 
and trim schedules through increased use of COTS, increased SEE testing costs stand out all the 
more.  The very actions that economize other aspects of the design process can increase either 
SEE HA costs or—more likely—the risks that SEE may cause the mission to fail. 
     These significant new challenges present an opportunity to step back and view SEE HA in 
terms of its roots in risk management.  Although SEE pose unique risks, the management of 
those risks follows the same basic steps as risk management for any other threat/hazard, namely: 
1) Identify the threat—mainly by examining the mission radiation environment, the 
technologies used in the mission and their application conditions (e.g., temperature, 
voltage, etc.) 
2) Evaluate the threat—in terms of the threat risk, R(T)=P(T)C(T), where P(T) the 
probability of the threat occurring and C(T) is the cost or consequences to the mission if 
the threat is realized.  Both  P(T) and C(T) can be evaluated using a variety of data 
types—from SEE test data on flight-like parts to data on similar parts, etc. 
3) Mitigate the threat—either reducing the probability that a threat occurs or the 
consequences if it does occur.   
These steps hold true for SEE mitigation for any space mission—be it a nanosat or a National 
Asset.  What varies are the resources available for evaluation and mitigation.  In this short 
course, we examine SEE HA as a risk mitigation activity, capitalizing on the structure this 
introduces to highlight how SEE HA changes for different mission classes and why it can be 
difficult to translate additional risk tolerance into savings on SEE HA activities.   
     We begin by reviewing some fundamental aspects of SEE, including the space radiation 
environment and various types of SEE and their mechanisms.  Next, we examine the 
conventional approach to SEE HA as it is applied to primary payload missions—from threat 
identification through threat evaluation and mitigation.  Following this overview, we look at how 
SEE HA differs for SmallSats.  In this discussion, the secondary payload status of most 
SmallSats imposes important constraints, encouraging use of COTS technologies, which in turn 
affects how SEE HA can be applied to such missions.  Finally, we mention some of the 
approaches taken by various groups to dealing with these constraints.   
1.1 Preliminary Concepts 
SEE occur when an ionizing particle traverses a sensitive region in an active semiconductor 
device and generates sufficient charge (called the critical charge or Qc) to alter the normal 
functionality of the device.  The ionizing particle may either be primary—originating in the 
mission radiation environment—or secondary—resulting from a scattering event between a 
primary environment particle and materials within the device in which the SEE occurs.  (See 
Figure 1-1.) 
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Figure 1-1 Single-event effects occur when an energetic ionizing particle traverses a volume in the device sensitive 
to the SEE (the sensitive volume, or SV).  The ionizing particle may either be primary from the mission radiation 
environment (red arrow) or secondary—generated by collisions between lightly ionizing primary particles (dashed 
blue line--usually protons, p+) and nuclei within the semiconductor. 
 
In general, the greater the charge Q generated in the sensitive volume (SV) of the device, 
the more likely an SEE is to occur.  Q depends on both the density of the charge track and on the 
path length of the ion through the sensitive volume.  Charge track density is proportional to the 
ion’s LET (linear energy transfer) is defined as the rate of energy loss along the ion track path, 
normalized to target material density), so  
 dx)x(LETQ  ,          (1) 
where x is the linear distance along the charge track.  For Si, an electron-hole pair is generated 
for every 3.6 eV of energy deposited by the track.  In general LET depends on the charge of the 
ion, its mass and its energy.  As Figure 1-2 illustrates for 56Fe ions, LET at high energies is low, 
rising as ion energy decreases to a maximum value called the Bragg peak, and then falling 
rapidly to 0 as ion energy goes to 0. (Note, the minimum LET vs. energy (called minimum 
ionizing energy) occurs when the kinetic energy of the ion is a bit over twice its rest energy.  
Above this energy, LET rises gradually with increasing ion energy, but ion fluxes in the space 
environment are negligible in this energy range.)  In practical terms, LET for ions with energies 
significantly higher than the Bragg peak change relatively slowly, making it possible to 
approximate LET of the ion as a constant value.  Then the charge deposited in the SV is 
proportional to LET multiplied by the chord length through the SV.  This simplifies the rate 
estimation process by separating the model into a part that depends only on the distribution of 
ion LETs—a property of the space environment—and a part that depends only on the device 
response versus LET—a property of the device to be determined by testing and modeling.   
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Figure 1-2: The rate of energy deposition/loss of a charged particle can be characterized by its LET—the energy lost 
per unit length along the ion track normalized to the density of the target material.  Since almost all the energy lost 
goes into ionizing the medium, the total charge generated by the track is proportional to the integral of LET along 
the track length x.  The maximum LET occurs for the Bragg Peak, with LET decreasing gradually at higher energy 
and rapidly at lower energy as the ion particle ranges out. 
 
The most common measure of the likelihood of SEE occurrence as a cross section, the ratio of 
the SEE count to the ion fluence (particles per unit area) that cause the errors.  As such, SEE 
cross section has units of area, and can be thought of—very loosely—as the area on the chip 
susceptible to the SEE.  One of the most important products of SEE testing is the curve that 
measures SEE cross section  as a function of LET,  vs. LET.  This curve characterizes device 
response and is used to estimate SEE rates.  Figure 1-3 shows the cross section for single-event 
upsets in a 256K static random access memory (SRAM), the Elpida HM65656.  For very low 
LETs, the path length through the SV is too short for the ion to deposit the critical charge Qc.  
Above the onset LET, LET0, where one first begins to register SEE,  rises rapidly.  Eventually, 
the cross section saturates at the limiting cross section (lim) or increases only slightly with 
higher LET. Often, the  vs. LET curve is fit to a cumulative Weibull form: 
 )s,w,LETLET(Weibull)LET( lim 0  ,     (2) 
where w and s are the Weibull width and shape parameters.  The Weibull fit parameters can then 
serve as input to SEE rate estimation routines, such as CREME96.   
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Figure 1-3: SEE susceptibility is measured by the SEE cross section —the ratio of the number of events seen to the 
ion fluence.  Usually,  is 0 up to some minimum LET, LET0, and then rises rapidly until plateauing at high LET at 
the limiting cross section lim.  The  vs. LET is often fit to a cumulative Weibull form, with the fit parameters 
serving as input to SEE rate estimation routines. 
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2 The SEE Radiation Environment 
Although in principle, an SEE could be caused by any ionizing particle, for technologies flown 
to date, the particles responsible have been neutrons (via indirect ionization), protons (via both 
direct and indirect ionization), and heavier ions (mainly via direct ionization).  Recent SEE 
experiments have revealed that deep submicron complementary metal oxide semiconductor 
(CMOS) devices may be susceptible to SEE from muons and even electrons [9-10].  However, 
since these devices are not at present seen as realistic candidates for flight projects, we confine 
ourselves for the most part to consideration of neutrons, protons and heavier ions.   
2.1 The Terrestrial SEE Environment 
In the terrestrial space radiation environment, SEE rates are dominated by neutrons that are the 
last surviving daughter products of showers of particles from interactions between high-energy 
galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and the atmosphere.  Neutron fluxes at sea level are low—for 
example only about 14 neutrons/cm2 per hour, but fluxes rise roughly exponentially with 
altitude.  Fluxes also rise as one heads poleward, and there are also slight dependencies on 
longitude (due to geomagnetic field variations). Peak neutron fluxes occur at about 60,000 feet of 
altitude near the poles and are about 4/cm2 per second [11].  Terrestrial SEE are of importance 
mainly for aircraft avionics (due to the altitude dependence of neutron fluxes and the large 
number of flight hours), large data storage facilities [12] and highly critical applications such as 
biomedical devices [13].  SEE are also expected to be of critical importance for drones and 
autonomous vehicles.   
The most numerous energetic (>100 MeV) particles at sea level are muons, which are also 
produced in cosmic ray particle showers.  Recent work has shown that muons can cause SEE in 
some deep submicron SRAMs, especially for reduced supply voltages [9, 14-15].  However, for 
the foreseeable future, it is likely that neutrons will continue to be the dominant source of 
terrestrial and atmospheric SEE.  For altitudes higher than ~20,000 m, pions, protons and even 
some residual GCR heavy ions can contribute to SEE [16].  (See figure 2-1.) 
 
Figure 2-1: In the terrestrial SEE environment, SEE are mainly caused by neutrons—the products of collisions 
between galactic cosmic rays and nuclei in the atmosphere.  For very sensitive devices, muons may also contribute 
to the rate at sea level.  At higher altitudes, one begins to see contributions from mesons and eventually from the 
most energetic GCR ions, which penetrate as far as the upper stratosphere.   
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In addition to the natural particle environments, interactions between parts or packaging and the 
terrestrial radiation environment can also contribute to SEE.  Radioactive elements associated 
with Pb in solders can produce  particles, and low-energy neutrons can cause 10B in borosilicate 
passivation to fission into an  particle and a 7Li ion.  These mechanisms and the subject of 
terrestrial SEE in general were covered in an Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) NSREC Short Course by Robert Baumann in 2013 [17].  As such, in the remainder of 
this Short Course, we concentrate on SEE in space environments. 
2.2 Space Radiation Environments 
In the space radiation environment, the particles responsible for SEE are mainly high-energy 
protons and heavier ions.  Neutrons may be generated during the interaction between the primary 
environment and spacecraft materials, but their fluxes are usually negligible.  Low-energy 
protons may also contribute to SEE for very sensitive microcircuits, but to date have not been a 
major source of SEE in space hardware [18].   
The space radiation environment encompasses a broad range of possible threat levels.  Low-
altitude, low-inclination Earth orbits are well shielded by the geomagnetic field, which reduces 
fluxes of GCR and solar particles and up to ~200 km above the planet’s surface, includes 
negligible fluxes of particles trapped by those same fields.  In contrast, interplanetary space 
provides little protection from GCR and full exposure solar particle events, and the trapped 
radiation belts of Jupiter can result in exposures up to 107 > 10-MeV protons/cm2 per second 
[19].   
Figure 2-2 illustrates the main components of the space radiation environment, GCR, Solar 
Particle Events (SPE), and trapped radiation belts.  These are described in more detail below.  
Although GCR energies can reach over 1021 eV, most of the flux has energies from a few 
hundred MeV to a few GeV/nucleon.  They consist of all elements (1Z92) [20].  The Sun is a 
source of electrons, protons and heavier ions in the solar wind and occasional more energetic 
bursts of protons and ions during solar particle events, which can include high fluxes of protons 
and heavier ions over periods of a few hours to a few days [21].  Protons and electrons can also 
become trapped by planetary magnetic fields, forming toroidal radiation belts.  For Earth, this 
includes an inner proton belt with energies up to a few hundred MeV and an outer electron belt 
with energies of a few MeV. 
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Figure 2-2 Space radiation environments includes several sources of energetic ions.  Galactic cosmic rays impinge 
isotropically on the solar system with a low but fairly consistent flux.  Solar Particle events produce episodic high 
fluxes of protons and heavier ions for times ranging from a few hours to a few days.  They can occur any time, but 
are most likely during solar maximum.  Particles trapped by planetary magnetic fields form torroidal belts 
surrounding the planet and can result in fluxes exceeding 105 protons/cm2/s in the heart of the proton belts. 
2.2.1 Galactic Cosmic Rays 
Galactic cosmic rays are very high energy particles that originate outside the Solar System.  
Although protons account for about 90% of GCR, the main particles of interest are GCR heavy 
ions (2Z92).  Because GCR originate in the explosions of supernovae, they are accelerated to 
high energies (peaking around several hundred MeV per nucleon), making shielding an 
impractical mitigation strategy against GCR induced SEE [20].  Figure 2-3 shows the flux vs. 
energy dependence for GCR ions (1Z92) from the CRÈME96 model for conditions of Solar 
Minimum and after traversing 100 mil of aluminum equivalent shielding (sufficient to attenuate 
the low-energy tail).  Because Fe ions play an important role in the explosions of supernovae, 
they are much more abundant than ions of comparable atomic number, and so are important in 
determining SEE rates.   
     For purposes of SEE rate estimation, it is convenient to bin GCR ions according to their LET.  
Figure 2-4 illustrates the ion flux for both a geostationary orbit (GEO) and the orbit of the 
International Space Station (ISS).  The differences between GEO and ISS fluxes illustrate the 
effect of attenuation by the geomagnetic field, while the differences between Solar Maximum 
and Solar Minimum illustrate the effect of the solar activity (e.g., the solar wind and 
heliomagnetic field).  The rapid rise in flux seen just above LET=1 MeV-cm2/mg is largely due 
to Fe ions near their minimum ionizing LET, while the drop off just below LET=30 MeV-
cm2/mg represents Fe ions near their Bragg Peak.  GCR fluxes are sufficiently consistent that the 
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CREME96 model presents just two conditions—Solar Minimum (maximum GCR flux) and 
Solar Maximum (minimum GCR flux).  SEE rates during Solar Minimum are often about 3x 
higher than those during solar maximum.  Attenuation of the GCR flux due to the heliomagnetic 
field and solar wind also weakens with distance from the Sun, with fluxes increasing by about 
4% per Astronomical Unit (AU) for high-energy ions near the peak flux and about 10% per AU 
for ions with energies less than 100 MeV/u [21].  Thus, GCR SEE rates at Jupiter could be 50% 
higher than those near Earth, those at Saturn near double those near Earth. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Although the vast majority of GCR are protons, there are substantial fluxes of heavier nuclei, especially 
Fe, which, due to its high nuclear binding energy is the most abundant heavy element.  Magenta stars indicate the 
Energy (in MeV/nucleon) where the ion’s Bragg Peak occurs, and the vertical blue bar indicates where the LET is 
minimum. 
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Figure 2-4: Galactic cosmic ray flux vs. LET at geostationary orbit and for the orbit of the International Space 
Station for Solar Maximum and Solar Minimum conditions in the CREME96 model. 
 
2.2.2 Solar Particle Events 
Solar Particle Events occur when a coronal mass ejection (CME) throws off a jet of plasma.  The 
particles follow magnetic field lines through interplanetary space, being accelerated in some 
cases to 80% of the speed of light.  Such events are directional and vary considerably in terms of 
duration, particle types, and particle energies.  However, several generalizations are possible.   
1) Although SPE can occur at any time, they are much more likely during Solar Maximum, 
and the more magnetically active the Sun, the more likely they are. (Cumulative solar 
proton fluences are about 2 orders of magnitude higher in Solar Maximum years than in 
Solar Minimum years on average.) [20] 
2) Reference 20 found that SPE fluences roughly follow a truncated power law distribution, 
and that worst-case events ought to be bounded by 9.6108 cm-2 (70% Confidence), 
4.6109 cm-2 (90% Confidence), and 1.21010 cm-2 (99% Confidence) for 30-MeV 
protons.  For other energy thresholds, the bounds scaled roughly exponentially with the 
threshold energy.  
a. SPE proton and ion energy spectra are considerably softer than those of GCR.  
This means that moderately heavy shielding (>500 mil Al equivalent) can be 
effective against these events.   
b. Generally, the ion species in a SPE are representative of solar abundances, 
although some (including the October 1989 event in Figure 1-8) are enhanced in 
heavier ions—especially Fe. 
Over the worst day, very large SPE like the October 1989 event can increase SEE rates by over 
1000 for very soft devices (Onset LET <~1 MeV-cm2/mg) and by >100 for harder devices, 
compared to GCR background rates.   
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Figure 2-5: Heavy-ion flux vs. energy for the October 1989 Solar Particle Event as modeled in CREME96. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Flux vs. LET for the October 1989 SPE in CREME96 compared the Solar Minimum CREME96 Flux. 
2.2.3 Trapped Radiation 
Permanent radiation belts form as a result of energetic charged particles in the space plasma with 
planetary magnetic fields.  In addition to Earth’s Van Allen Belts, Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn, 
Uranus and Neptune have all been observed to have radiation belts.  Although radiation belt 
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models exist for Saturn, and preliminary models based on Voyager data have been constructed 
for Uranus and Neptune, Jupiter.  In this course, we will concentrate on Earth’s trapped 
radiation.  However, interested readers can refer to [19] for discussion of the Jovian 
magnetosphere, to [23] for discussion of modelling of Saturn’s radiation environment and to [24] 
for a general review of space weather including trapped radiation for planets and moons 
throughout the Solar System. 
     The main trapped particles of concern are protons.  (Trapped heavy ions have been observed 
in Earth’s magnetosphere, but their energies are too low to be of concern if parts have even very 
light shielding (>100 m Al equivalent) [25].)  The trapped proton flux of concern varies 
significantly in terms of the spacecraft’s orbit (both radius and inclination), the proton energy 
required to cause an SEE and when the mission is flying.  In Low-Earth Orbits (LEO) with low 
inclination, fluxes may be <100 protons/cm2/s for energies >30 MeV, while in the South Atlantic 
Anomaly at comparable altitudes, peak fluxes can be over 2000 protons/cm2/s.  The highest 
proton fluences occur are found in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)—about 3500-8000 km above the 
equator and can exceed 105 protons/cm2/s. 
     For trapped protons, there are currently two widely used models AP8, and its successor AP9.  
AP8 has the advantages of simplicity (the only choice is between AP8MIN and AP8MAX) and 
familiarity.  AP9 allows confidence levels to be selected for the environment that reflect 
uncertainties due to both measurement errors and limitations and environmental fluctuations 
[26].  Although most of the differences between the models are minor, for higher energies, which 
are important for determining SEE rates, differences can be significant for some orbits. The 
ability in AP9 to select a confidence level is potentially important for SEEHA to ensure that SEE 
mitigations are not overcome by environmental fluctuations. 
     Finally, although, we have considered the sources of ionizing particles in the space radiation 
environment separately, the total particle flux is additive.  While some GCR and SPE particles 
are shielded by the geomagnetic field in a LEO environment, many penetrate and contribute to 
SEE along with the trapped protons.  The total threat from the environment depends on the 
fluxes of each ion species and their energy spectra. 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  13 
 
Figure 2-7: AP9(50%)/AP8 Flux ratios for >60 MeV protons on a polar cut 72 W to 108 E [27].   
2.2.4 Particle Transport and Secondary Particle Environment 
In order to cause SEE in a device, the particles from the space environment must reach the 
device SV.  This means that they must traverse the materials that make up the spacecraft, 
packaging and other inert materials above the SV.  In doing so, it may suffer one of 3 fates: 
1) It may not have sufficient energy to reach the SV, stopping in the overburden above. 
2) It may lose energy gradually, changing its LET, angle of incidence, etc. 
3) It may collide with nuclei, transforming ion species, generating secondary particles. 
There exist several options for transporting the external spacecraft environment through the 
spacecraft, and the degree of fidelity required—both for the spacecraft model and the transport 
code—depends on the sensitivity of the device being assessed and the space environment being 
considered.  Shielding has relatively little influence on GCR fluxes, other than to filter out the 
low-energy tail of GCR ions.  Usually for GCR, it is sufficient to transport the ions through a 100 
mil Al equivalent spherical shell, which can be done in CREME96.  GCR ions are sufficiently 
energetic, and the flux vs. energy distribution is sufficiently flat over a broad range of energies 
that changing the shielding will not dramatically affect the SEE rate.  Better understanding of 
shielding is more important for dealing with solar heavy ions.  The energies of these particles are 
lower, so LET changes more and more ions range out as the shielding changes.  Perhaps the most 
detailed transport calculations are required if the device in question is susceptible to SEE caused 
by direct ionization of low-energy protons.  In this case, a transport calculation through a 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  14 
detailed model of the spacecraft may be required using NOVICE or another Monte Carlo 
transport package [28]. 
 Secondary particle environments are also important when considering nuclear 
interactions.  In such interactions, ions are produced in a range of species (Z), energies, angles 
relative to the incident primary particle and LETs.  These distributions are determined using 
Monte Carlo codes that simulate the processes of nuclear cascade and evaporation.  Examples 
include recoil ions generated by interactions between Si nuclei in the device SV and high-energy 
protons from the space environment [29-32], recoil ions generated by light ions colliding with 
high-Z materials (e.g., W vias) in hardened SRAMs [33] and the discovery in 2015 that protons 
can generate heavy ions by causing high-Z materials in packaging to fission [34,35].  Although 
such nuclear interactions are usually rare, there are lots of protons in many space environments, 
and this can result in SEE rates being dominated by such proton-nuclear processes.  As an 
example, Figure 2-8 compares the relative flux vs. LET distributions for GCR ions with those 
generated by interactions of proton fluences in the GEO and ISS environments interacting with a 
1-m layer of Au ions.  The relative fluxes suggest the threat from fission products could 
dominate that due to GCR for devices with onset LET LET0>15 MeV-cm2/mg for GEO and 
above 10 MeV-cm2/mg for ISS.  However, fission daughter products—as well as recoil ions 
from proton and light-ion scattering—tend to be low energy and have short range, so overburden 
and SV dimensions significantly affect this conclusion.  The SEE threat depends on device 
susceptibilities as well as the mission radiation environment. 
 
Figure 2-8: Comparison of GCR ion LET flux with that from proton on Au fission fragments for mission proton 
environments (averaged over mission) incident on 1-m Au foil for the environment at the ISS and in geostationary 
orbit.
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3 SEE Mechanisms and Consequences 
Since their discovery 45 years ago, SEE mechanisms have proliferated into a veritable alphabet 
soup of acronyms.  There are destructive SEE (DSEE), including single-event latchup (SEL), 
single-event burnout (SEB), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event dielectric rupture 
(SEDR), single-event stuck bits (SESB) and so on.  There are nondestructive SEE (NDSEE), 
including SEU, multibit upset (MBU—bits in same logical word) and multi-cell upset (MCU—
bits in different words), block errors, column errors, row errors, single-event functional interrupt 
(SEFI), and even multiple types of single-event transients (SET)—digital and analog (DSET and 
ASET).  Further complicating the picture, different papers in the literature may use different 
definitions for SEFI or MBU.  To strip away the confusion, it is useful to consider SEE in terms 
of the characteristics that are important for risk identification, assessment and mitigation: 
1) Direct consequences of an SEE are confined to the die in which it occurs.  This does not 
mean that consequences of an SEE (e.g., errors, overcurrent, etc.) cannot propagate and 
affect other components in the system. 
a. Exception: Independent SEE can be caused by the same ion in parts where die are 
stacked on top of each other.   
2) SEE are Poisson processes.  This means that: 
a. The rate is constant as long as the environment is constant (on average), so the 
expected number of SEE in a given interval depends only on interval length. 
b. SEE rates are additive, so that if a part in a system (or satellite in a swarm) has 
rate , a system win N such parts has rate N. 
c. Times between SEE are distributed exponentially. 
3) SEE can have the following consequences at the level of the part in which they occur: 
a. They can produce a transient disturbance in normal function of the part that 
recovers automatically after a short time (SET on ps to ms time scales) 
b. They can cause errors in data that can be corrected (rewritten) in the part (e.g., 
and SEU or MBU) 
c. They can corrupt large amounts of data, although the data can be corrected 
(rewritten) at least in principle (e.g., block errors, column errors, etc.). 
d. They can cause permanent errors that cannot be corrected within the part (e.g., 
stuck bits).  
e. They can interrupt normal functionality of the part, requiring either intervention 
(e.g., power cycling and re-initialization) or long recovery times to restore full 
functionality (e.g., SEFI).  Large amounts of data may also be corrupted. 
f. They can result in partial or complete failure of the part (e.g., DSEE, including 
SEL, SEB, SEGR, etc.) 
4) SEE consequences at the system level depend on the function for which the part in which 
it occurs is responsible.  A destructive SEE in a part responsible for a trivial function may 
be less consequential than a SET while a part is executing a critical function.  Reference 
[36] discusses the implementation of a SEE Criticality Analysis—analogous to a failure 
modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). 
We next consider some of the characteristics important for risk identification, assessment and 
mitigation for particular destructive and nondestructive SEE modes.   
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3.1 Destructive SEE Modes 
Destructive SEE pose special challenges for SEE hardness assurance, not just because of their 
potentially severe consequences, but because understanding of a phenomenon that is inherently 
destructive—or at the least, very disruptive—will usually be based on poor statistics and because 
uncertainties may remain about the mechanisms of the effect.  However, not all destructive SEE 
modes pose equal challenges.  In some cases, destructive failure can be circumvented during 
testing by current limiting or power cycling when a high-current is detected.  This allows decent 
statistics to be accumulated.  And the mechanisms of some SEE modes are better understood 
than others.  We start with one of the most common and best understood modes, SEL. 
3.1.1 Single-Event Latchup 
Single-event latchup is a complex, regenerative, parasitic failure mode that has been observed in 
CMOS microcircuits that have a thyristor or Silicon Controlled Register (SCR, pnpn) structure 
(see Figure 3-1).  We can view this structure as two parasitic bipolar junction transistors 
connected collector to base of the other, resulting in a regenerative gain of the current flowing 
when charge from an ion is injected into the system.  The issues relevant to SEE risk 
management include:  
1) The consequences of the high-currents associated with SEL can result in 
a. Catastrophic thermal failure  
b. Latent damage, in which metallization is melted, dielectrics cracked [37].   
c. Recoverable loss of functionality and high current state, but no failure or latent 
damage—a so-called nondestructive SEL.  Demonstrating that no damage has 
occurred is challenging, requiring extensive SEL testing, and a post-SEL 
investigation involving microscopic inspection of the die and a burn-in type life 
test to realize any latent damage that may be present [38]. 
2)   Worst-case conditions for SEL occurrence include  
a. Higher voltage (testing usually done at worst-case operating voltages) [39]  
b. Elevated temperature (should bound WC application temperature) [40] 
c. Ions with sufficient energy/range to penetrate to the substrate of the device, 
usually several 10s of microns.  This means that ions with short range—e.g. 
proton-Si recoil ions, 252Cf fission products or the products of proton-induced 
fissions of high Z materials—are likely to underestimate SEL rates for susceptible 
devices, and may not cause SEL at all. [41, 42] 
3) A SEL mechanism can be initiated at cryogenic temperature, despite the loss of charge 
carriers due to freeze-out.  The mechanism results when charge carrier mobility increases 
sufficiently that impact ionization can cause avalanches of charge carriers [42].  Data on 
this effect are limited, but susceptibility appears to occur below about 30 K. 
4) Because SEL is a parasitic effect and circuit layout is important, data for similar parts has 
limited value for assessing SEL risk.  Reference [43] found that SEL rates could vary 
several orders magnitude for similar parts fabricated in the same process, and the even 
onset LETs for latchup did not appear to form a well behaved distribution. 
5) Mitigation strategies that may be effective against SEL include: 
a. Avoidance or SEL susceptible parts.  In some cases, rates may also be reduced by 
avoiding conditions (e.g., high temperature and voltage) where SEL rates are 
high. 
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b. Cold-spare redundant parts can be included to replace parts that have failed due to 
SEL.  Note that may require the failed parts to be isolated from the system, which 
can complicate system architecture as well as increasing system weight and size. 
c. Current limiting and power cycling when a rise in current is detected followed by 
a reset/re-initialization of the part.  This can introduce the possibility of spurious 
resets, and in some cases, the current rise is too rapid to avoid damage to the part. 
SEL mechanisms are sufficiently well understood that SEL rates can be estimated using standard 
rate estimation routines, such as CREME96. 
 
Figure 3-1 Single-event latchup occurs when an ionizing particle injects sufficient charge to turn on a parasitic 
thyristor in a CMOS structure.  Once turned on, the SEL is self-sustaining, and resulting high-currents can cause 
thermal failure in the device. 
3.1.2 Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) 
SEGR is an inherently destructive failure mode that occurs when a power metal oxide 
semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET) is in its OFF (nonconducting) state.  In SEGR, 
an ion passing through the gate of the MOSFET generates sufficiently high electric fields to 
break down the gate oxide.  SEGR actually involves a two-step process (see Figure 3-2):  First 
the ion passes through the gate oxide, weakening it and reducing the voltage needed to break 
down the oxide.  Next, the ion passes through the channel of the MOSFET, generating charge, 
which is separated by the vertical field so that the holes pile up under the weakened gate, 
augmenting the electric field across the gate oxide due to the gate-to-source voltage VGS until 
the gate dielectric breaks down.  The resulting rush of current causes the MOSFET to fail 
thermally.  The following characteristics are important when managing risk for SEGR in power 
MOSFETs [44]: 
1) SEGR is inherently destructive.  As such every data point represents the destruction of a 
MOSFET.  Nondestructive events may be seen during heavy-ion irradiation (especially 
when VGS=0) that cause current to jump discontinuously, but leave the device still 
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functional.  While these are thought to involve gate-oxide damage, they do not constitute 
a “nondestructive SEGR” and so cannot be used to facilitate SEGR rate estimation. 
2) Worst case conditions for realizing SEGR include: 
a. MOSFET OFF (VGS0 for N-Channel or VGS0 for P-Channel) 
b. Ion incident normally to the die (for a vertical device the geometry is most likely 
to pile holes under the weakened portion of the gate oxide) 
c. High |VDS| and |VGS| 
d. High Z ions [46] 
e. Ion energy/range sufficient to penetrate to the device substrate (may be 10s of 
m).  Even more so than for SEL, short range ions (proton-Si recoils, high-Z 
fission events) are unlikely to reveal SEGR susceptibilities. 
3) Rate estimation is not possible due to the complicated dependence of SEGR susceptibility 
on ion Z, energy and angle, coupled with part-to-part variation for a failure mode where 
each new data point requires a new part.  Instead, the product of SEGR testing is a “safe-
operating area” of VDS and VGS values where SEGR susceptibility is negligible. (See 
Figure 3-3.) 
4) Mitigation strategies for SEGR are limited: 
a. Avoiding parts susceptible to SEGR for the application conditions for the mission. 
b. Ensuring VDS and VGS are well within the safe-operating area 
c. Redundancy may work in some applications, but will likely result in lower 
efficiency and more complicated circuitry. 
5) Commercial MOSFETs tend to fail due to SEB rather than SEGR, while most radiation 
hardened MOSFETs fail due to SEGR.  Exceptions exist. 
6) “Similar” parts may introduce new mechanisms.  Si TrenchFETs, SiC MOSFETs, GaN 
MOSFETs degrade under exposure to heavy ions.  MOSFET-like structures in Flash 
memory charge pumps can fail destructively when erasing or writing memory cells. 
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Figure 3-2: Single-event gate rupture occurs when an ion traverses the gate oxide, weakening the dielectric, and then 
generates sufficient charge in the channel that when the charges pile up under the gate, the resulting electric field is 
sufficient to cause breakdown of the weakened dielectric [45]. 
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Figure 3-3: The usual product of SEGR testing is a graph of “safe operating” conditions or, more conservatively, a 
device response curve—for the MOSFET—VDS and VGS conditions where SEGR risk is minimal for the ion used.  
This device response curve for a radiation-hardened N-channel shows that both ion species and ion energy/range 
affect device responsibility [46]. 
3.1.3 Single-Event Burnout 
Like SEL, SEB is a parasitic bipolar effect.  It can occur in power MOSFETs, bipolar junction 
transistors (BJT) or field effect transistors (FETs).  In SEB, a parasitic BJT in the transistor 
structure gets turned on by charge injected by the ion. (See Figure 3-4.)  If the voltage across the 
transistor is sufficiently high, charge carriers can become sufficiently energetic to generate 
additional carriers via impact ionization—a process called second breakdown—and the resulting 
high-current state can destroy the transistor.  Unlike SEGR, SEB is not necessarily destructive.  
The process can be stopped by current limiting. Characteristics of SEB important for SEE risk 
management include [44]: 
1) Worst case conditions for SEB are similar to those for SEGR: 
a. MOSFET OFF (VGS0 for N-Channel or VGS0 for P-Channel) 
b. Ion incident normally to the die  
c. High |VDS| and |VGS| 
d. High Z ions (effect not fully understood) [47] 
e. Ion energy/range sufficient to penetrate ~30s m.  As with SEL and SEGR, short 
range ions (proton-Si recoils, high-Z fission events) are unlikely to reveal SEB 
susceptibilities fully 
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2) Thermal latent damage is possible. 
3) The fact that SEB can be stopped before it destroys the part makes it possible to 
accumulate statistics for the same part.  This means that  vs. LET can be measured, and, 
in principle, rates could be determined.  In practice, the complex dependence on ion 
species, energy and angle makes rate estimation impractical.  The normal product of SEB 
testing is similar to that for SEGR—a “safe-operating area” of VDS and VGS values 
where SEB susceptibility is negligible. 
4) Mitigation strategies for SEB are mostly similar to SEGR 
a. Avoiding parts susceptible to SEB for the application conditions for the mission. 
b. Ensuring VDS and VGS are well within the safe-operating area 
c. Current limiting can effectively limit SEB risk, but can compromise efficiency 
d. Redundancy can be effective in some applications 
5) SEB is the dominant SEE failure mode for commercial MOSFETs and related devices 
a. Some parts may exhibit very low voltages for onset of SEB (e.g., 22% of the rated 
VDS for the International Rectifier IRF640) [48] 
b. Part-to-part variability can be significant for some commercial devices [49]. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Single-event burnout occurs when a parasitic bipolar in a MOSFET is turned on by an ion strike.  If the 
voltage is sufficiently high and a source of current on the collector sufficiently large, the charge carriers can 
avalanche via impact ionization (second breakdown) resulting in device failure.   
3.1.4 Other Destructive SEE 
Although SEL, SEGR and SEB are the main destructive SEE threats for most technologies, there 
are other potentially destructive SEE that may affect some specific part types.  Single-event 
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dielectric rupture (SEDR) is similar to SEGR in that parts are most susceptible when the ions are 
incident normal to the die.  It has been seen in some one-time programmable field programmable 
gate arrays (FPGAs) [SEDR] and in MOS capacitors in some linear bipolar devices [50].  Like 
SEGR, the main mitigation technique for SEDR is avoidance—either by using parts hardened to 
the effect or avoiding conditions where the parts are susceptible.   
     Single-event snapback is yet another potentially damaging parasitic bipolar effect, mainly in 
SOI devices.  Although snapback can generate currents sufficiently high to cause damage, it is 
usually not a major threat to reliability [44].   
     Stuck bits have been seen in a variety of devices—mainly memories.  They occur when an ion 
deposits sufficiently large amounts of charge in a gate oxide of a transistor that it can no longer 
be programmed.  The bit then behaves like a permanently upset bit. Stuck bits have remained 
sufficiently rare, and mitigation is the same as that for SEU, so to date, they have not been a 
major issue. 
     The observation in 2013 that Schottky diodes could fail due to SEE raised significant 
questions about some basic assumptions of SEE HA [51].  In most cases, diodes were considered 
to be immune from anything more pernicious than extremely short transients.  Although the 
mechanism for this effect is not well understood, the failure mode is sufficiently common that 
risk avoidance should be the main mitigation approach.  To date, no failures have been seen in 
parts derated to 50% or below of their rated voltage [52].  If such derating is not possible, testing 
is recommended. 
3.2 Nondestructive SEE 
After the previous discussion of destructive SEE, one might be tempted to heave a sigh of relief 
at the sight of the word nondestructive in the heading above.  That relief would be premature.  A 
system can be taken off line as surely by an SEU or SET as by an SEL.  The consequences of an 
SEE depend on the criticality of the function compromised by it—that is, by the function the 
device was performing when the SEE occurred.  The type of SEE that occurs depends on the 
device in which it occurs.  Table I summarizes the main nondestructive SEE modes, the 
vulnerable technologies and mitigation/recovery strategies. 
     The risk posed by an SEE depends on the rate at which it is expected to occur and the 
consequences of the SEE when it occurs.  The consequences of the SEE depend on how the SEE 
affects the struck part and on the part was executing when the SEE occurred.  Thus, one must 
follow the propagation of the error downstream to its ultimate effect.  This is especially true for 
SETs. 
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Table I: Nondestructive SEE Modes 
Mode Definition Mode occurs in Mitigation/Comments 
SET Temporary, self-recovering 
disturbance in device output 
or function 
Analog or digital devices, 
usually without bi-stable 
elements; inputs 
determine output(s) in 
absence of transient 
Multiple sampling, 
temporal voting, 
capacitative filtering 
SEU One or more bit flips in 
device; Correct value can be 
rewritten (if not it is a stuck 
bit) 
Digital, data storage cells, 
including bi-stable 
devices, DRAM cells, Flash 
cells 
Error correction code, 
voting multiple outputs or 
devices, duplicate 
compare w/ retry… 
MCU Multiple bit flips  by the same 
ion, but not necessarily in the 
same logical word; simple 
error code sufficient if bits 
not in same word 
Same as SEU Same as SEU 
MBU MCU with bits in the same 
logical word;  
Same as SEU Same as SEU, but requires 
more complicated ECC or 
voting bit-by-bit and more 
complicated architecture. 
Block 
Error 
Error in ADDRESS or other 
control logic corrupting large 
data blocks; normal part 
function not affected 
Same as SEU, but usually 
having large data arrays 
and can affect Column, 
Row or Block of address 
recovery same as for MBU, 
but done many times over 
SEFI Disturbance or cessation of 
normal functionality of 
device requiring intervention 
for recovery; Note: SEFI can 
often be viewed as an SEU 
that upsets control logic 
Usually occurs in devices 
with complex control logic 
(DRAMs, FLASH, FPGA, 
processors…), but can 
occur in fairly simple 
devices (e.g. ADC) 
May recover after part re-
initialized or may require 
power cycle and then re-
initialization; data and 
configuration likely lost; if 
power cycle required, 
requires significantly more 
complicated design or 
accept higher data loss. 
 
     Since the SET by definition lasts only a finite time, the effects at the system level depend on 
how the transient affects devices downstream of the output of the struck device.  Thus, 
specifying the consequences of an SET can be complicated, depending not just on the SET rate, 
but also on its duration and amplitude, as well as the functions of devices downstream of the 
struck device and their state of operation when the SET occurs.  An idea of the complexity of the 
duration-amplitude behavior can be gained from Figure 3-5, which shows an amplitude-duration 
scatterplot for the Linear Technologies LTC6268 operational amplifier (op amp) irradiated by 
ions with several different LETs.  Although the vast majority of transients last less than 10 s, a 
few transients have both high amplitude (>2 V) and long duration (>1 ms).  What is more, these 
long transients are seen for LET values as low as 4 MeV-cm2/mg.  Whether these transients 
constitute a threat to the mission depends on the application of the device.  This plot indicates 
some of the challenges in risk management for transients.  Mitigating the <10 s transients with 
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capacitive filtering or multiple samples of the readout would be straightforward and would likely 
not reduce performance of the device unacceptably.  However, the rare larger, longer transients 
are more likely to have adverse consequences and would be much harder to mitigate.  Would the 
mitigation be worth it, or would it be better to accept the consequences of a lower probability 
event?  These are the types of questions one has to answer when dealing with transients—or with 
nondestructive SEE generally. 
 
Figure 3-5: Single-event transients (SET) are temporary disturbances to the output of a device caused by an ion 
strike.  Although their waveform may be complicated, they are usually characterized by a duration and an amplitude.  
Although most SETs are short—ns to 10s of s—some devices, such as the LTC6268 exhibit transients that can last 
several milliseconds. 
 
     Similarly, in dealing with a SEU, a block error or a SEFI, accurate risk assessment requires 
following error propagation or loss of functionality to the system level as well as the SEE rate 
(determined from the  vs. LET curve), and the consequences in the struck device.  A block error 
may seem much more severe than an MBU, but the overhead needed for mitigation is the same 
(it will just be much more active with a block error).  Further complicating the situation, a single 
part may be susceptible to several or all of these SEE modes. (See Figure 3-6.) 
     There are two competing factors that determine the consequences of an SEE susceptibility:  
1) The direct consequences of the error/failure mode (#bits upset, loss of availability, etc.) 
2) The penalties incurred through use of the mitigation in terms of cost, performance, etc.  
The goal is to find mitigation strategies that limit consequences of the SEE to acceptable levels 
without inflicting unacceptable penalties on the performance, schedule or cost of the system—
and what is unacceptable to one mission may not be to another.  This will be discussed later in 
the section on mitigation.  At present, the important considerations for the next section on threat 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  25 
identification are the relative costs of mitigating different SEE modes.  Mitigation of short 
transients (e.g., via capacitive filtering) and single-bit SEU (e.g,. via voting or a Hamming or 
other simple error correction code (ECC)) is relatively straightforward.  If recovery from a SEFI 
requires only re-initialization of the part (e.g., by rewriting mode registers of a synchronous 
dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) or reloading configuration memory for a 
programmable FPGA), that may also be relatively simple as long as the loss of data and loss of 
availability during the recovery process are not an issue.  If a part is susceptible to multibit upsets 
or block errors corrupting more than one bit per word, mitigation becomes more complicated.  
Not only must the capability of the ECC increase, one may also have need a more complicated 
architecture (e.g., interleaving of bits from each word across multiple die) to avoid 
overwhelming the ECC. 
     Likewise, a transient >100 s may also be very difficult to mitigate for some applications.  
Generally, the most disruptive nondestructive SEE are SEFI requiring a power cycle and re-
initialization to recover functionality.  Such power-on/resets (POR) result in loss of all data 
stored in volatile memory and may require several minutes to execute.  Moreover, it is often not 
practical to engineer a system so that only the affected die is power cycled, necessitating power 
cycling at the board or box level, greater data loss and longer recovery time.  Destructive SEE 
are often the most difficult SEE modes to mitigate—so difficult that most missions require parts 
to be immune to these effects.  Often identifying destructive SEE susceptibility is the first 
priority in SEE analysis. 
 
Figure 3-6: Nondestructive SEE can have a range of consequences—from single or multiple bit flips to corruption of 
large blocks of data to stuck bits to complete loss of functionality requiring a power cycle and re-initialization for 
recovery.  SDRAMs, including the DDR3 device for which these data were taken, exhibit all of the above with 
comparable cross sections, making testing as well as operation challenging.   
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4 SEE Threat Identification 
An SEE threat is credible when a potentially susceptible technology is deployed in a mission 
environment where the threat could be realized and the consequences of the threat could 
compromise the required functionality of the part.  As such, the initial threat identification is 
made based on assessment of the mission requirements and environment and the technologies in 
the parts slated for the mission.  To some extent, such an analysis is subjective, in that it depends 
on the body of knowledge available to the analyst when the determination is made.  For instance, 
prior to 2012, Schottky diodes would likely not have been thought to be susceptible to 
destructive SEE.  However, after they were observed to fail during heavy-ion testing of a DC/DC 
converter, it is now recommended practice to derate them to 50% of their rated voltage or to test 
them if they are to be used at higher voltages [51].  Similarly, we will not know whether low-
energy protons are a concern until we know if the parts for the mission include deep-submicron 
commercial CMOS.   
4.1 Mission Requirements 
Top-level requirements for a mission lay out mission duration, performance and other conditions 
that must be met to achieve the mission objectives.  Usually, the top-level requirements will be at 
a sufficiently high level that they will not even mention radiation effects.  Rather, the relevant 
top-level requirements that will generate secondary and tertiary requirements pertinent to 
particular SEE related threats.  For instance, mission life and reliability requirements will 
generate requirements pertaining to destructive SEE and catastrophic system-level failures due to 
nondestructive SEE.  Availability requirements will generate requirements for recoverable but 
disruptive SEE, such as SEFI.  Data accuracy requirements will ultimately cover data corrupted 
by SEE (e.g., SETs, SEU, block errors, etc.).  In some cases, there may be no requirements that 
directly mention SEE, in which case, the SEE analysis relies on the discretion of the SEE 
analyst, responsible engineers and input from reliability experts. 
     Ultimately, requirements must be pertinent to mission objectives and to their parent 
requirements, attainable and verifiable.  They should also not be so prescriptive that they 
constrain designers unnecessarily. This usually means that it is best to keep the requirement to 
general goals and allow designers to decide on how to meet the requirement.  SEE requirements 
are usually verified through analysis, since SEE testing is destructive, and even if SEE test data 
are available, they must be interpreted using a model of the SEE mechanism to infer likely on-
orbit performance.  Attainability is also important.  If a particular requirement is driving design 
and/or cost, it may be prudent to discuss with mission planners whether there is any flexibility in 
the requirement that could provide relief, lower costs or facilitate achieving the rest of the 
mission requirements. 
4.2 Environments Revisited 
Once the trajectory or orbit for the mission is known, the analyst can determine the likely 
environments the spacecraft will face and assemble the models needed to specify those 
environments.  For the threat identification portion of the SEE analysis, the emphasis is on 
determining fluxes of particles likely to cause SEE for the duration and conditions of the mission 
and the desired levels of confidence.  In terrestrial environments, the particles are neutrons—and 
possibly muons for very sensitive devices.  For the most part in the space environment, the 
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particles of interest are high-energy protons and heavy ions.  We have previously discussed the 
sources of these particles.  For the risk identification portion of SEE HA, we are mainly 
interested in the adjustable parameters or features in the models of these different sources that 
can change particle fluxes, energy spectra and other factors that affect SEE rates.  Some sets of 
requirements may be sufficiently detailed that these factors are specified in detail.  If not, it is 
prudent to explore how much variability is possible given the specified requirements. 
Galactic cosmic rays will be present in all space environments, and the current de facto 
standard model for GCR is the CREME96 model.  (Note: Although other models exist, they do 
not significantly affect SEE rates [53].)  In reality, the GCR environment is dynamic, depending 
on modulation of heliomagnetic and solar wind conditions as well as the flux of particles 
impinging from throughout the galaxy.  In practice, however, the flux of GCR ions is sufficiently 
low that statistics are insufficient to model short-term fluctuations.  As such, the main factors 
that affect the output of the CREME96 GCR model the choice of Solar Maximum or Solar 
Minimum conditions and, for orbits inside Earth’s magnetosphere, whether geomagnetic 
conditions are quiet or stormy.  Since space weather, launch dates and the durations of solar 
cycles can all vary, it is prudent to explore the effects such variability could have on expected 
rates.  Solar Minimum conditions are worst case, and correspond the conditions observed during 
1986-87 [20].  Generally, SEE rates for Solar Maximum and Solar Minimum conditions in 
geostationary orbit vary by a factor of 3-10, depending on the shape of the  vs. LET curve 
(especially onset LET).  For the ISS (as an example of an environment within the geomagnetic 
field), solar minimum rates exceed those at solar maximum by roughly a factor of 2-10. 
Specifying stormy space weather can result in rates 20% to >2x higher than quiet conditions 
depending on the  vs. LET curve for the device of interest.  One factor that is not in the 
CREME96 model is the variability of GCR fluxes from one solar cycle to another.  The most 
recent solar minimum was the deepest seen during the space exploration era, with GCR fluxes 
from 14% (for protons) to 22% (ions w/ Z>2) higher than during the prior solar minimum [54].   
The analyst has more choices when it comes to solar particle events and trapped protons.  If 
the model specifies AP8, the only choice is whether to choose the model for solar maximum or 
that for solar minimum.  Confidence levels can also be selected by simulating several missions to 
reflect environmental variability and ordering the results.  The results can be used to assess the 
severity of the proton environment (both in terms of flux and energy spectrum) for causing SEE.   
For solar particles, there are two concerns.  The first is the cumulative fluence of solar 
protons and heavy ions accumulated during the mission.  The higher these fluences, the greater 
the expected SEE total during the mission and the average SEE per day. The second concern is 
the worst-case solar particle event.  During solar particle events, SEE rates can spike by more 
than 1000 for soft devices and over 100x for SEE hardened devices.  Such rates can overwhelm 
many mitigation schemes—especially those based on redundancy. 
Unlike previous cumulative fluence models for solar protons [55-58], the ESP [59] and 
PSYCHIC [60] models allow cumulative fluences of solar protons and heavy ions, respectively, 
to be bounded at a desired confidence level.  This allows designers to budget for average error 
rates in the design over the duration of the mission.  Unfortunately, the solar particle flux is 
rarely average, a single solar particle event can account for a significant fraction of the particle 
fluence in a given year or even a given solar cycle.  The concern for severe solar weather is that 
device-level SEE rates scale with particle flux, and if, for example, a redundant system fails after 
two independent upsets or failures, the system level failure rate will scale as the square of the 
device rate.  There are two approaches to bounding solar particle fluxes. The CREME96 SEE 
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rate estimation package includes a solar proton and heavy-ion model for the October 1989 SPE.   
This event was particularly large and had a relatively high heavy-ion content, it is likely to bound 
worst-case SEE rates.  However, it is not possible to say how conservative the bound will be.  
Several approaches have been developed to bound solar proton fluxes and fluences.  Reference 
[61] modeled solar proton fluences for SPE as a truncated power law distribution, which has the 
important implication that fluences are bounded, and there is not a low-probability tail extending 
to .  Reference [62] found that solar proton fluxes could exceed 1000 protons cm-2sr-1s-1 for 
about 24 hours during an average Solar Maximum year, and that for about 2 hours of that year 
could be more than 10x higher.  Solar heavy-ion fluxes are so much lower than solar proton 
fluxes that statistics on energy distribution tend to be poor.  Usually, they are assumed to scale 
roughly with proton fluxes, leading to a conservative bound on the actual solar ion environment.  
However, Reference [63] compared heavy-ion fluxes for the large November 2001 event to the 
October 1989 event model in CREME96 and found good agreement out to LET~1-3 MeV-
cm2/mg, but the CREME96 model was more severe at higher LET values.   This could suggest 
that the SPE model in CREME96 is conservative, or it may indicate that the October 1989 event 
was more enriched in heavy ions than that of November 2001. 
4.3 Technology and SEE Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned above, a SEE threat becomes credible when a vulnerable technology is used in an 
environment where the threat can be realized.  This raises questions not just of how to determine 
which SEE modes occur in which technologies, but prior to that how to determine the technology 
of a particular part.  Table II lists some electronics technologies and the SEE vulnerabilities 
associated with them.  
 
Table II: SEE Vulnerabilities of Electronics Technologies 
 
The list of SEE modes is not exhaustive…and even if it were, the rate of discovery of new SEE 
modes means it would not remain exhaustive for long.  In many cases, determining the 
technology of a part is straightforward.  Discrete components are usually straightforward, 
although there are exceptions (e.g., is a diode a Schottky diode or a super barrier junction 
device?).   State of the art parts like processors and memories, etc., will almost certainly have 
CMOS (although of what feature size is another question).  If a part has many operating modes, 
it is reasonable to expect complicated control logic and therefore SEFI modes.  In some cases, a 
vendor may produce devices only with a single or a few different technologies, and it may be 
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fairly straightforward to ascertain which technology is used in a particular part, especially if one 
is familiar with the process and consults the datasheet for the part.  Datasheets are often very 
useful, as simplified schematics often depict MOS transistors for CMOS, BJTs for bipolar and 
both for a BiCMOS.  If the datasheet is not helpful, the vendor may be.  This may be as simple as 
looking at the reliability data for the different processes.  For example, Analog Devices 
Reliability page list the technology for most part numbers in their inventory at: 
http://www.analog.com/en/about-adi/quality-reliability/reliability-data.html.  Otherwise, the 
analyst may be forced to try and find a knowledgeable and helpful source at the vendor.  
Moreover, the preceding discussion presumes that the SEE modes for the technology are known.  
This may not be the case, as new materials and device architectures are becoming increasingly 
common as the microelectronics industry strives to keep pace with Moore’s Law despite the 
failure of conventional CMOS scaling over a decade ago.   
     If one is confronted with a truly novel technology, the best approach may be to use the closest 
analogue to the new technology as a rough guide for what to expect.  The physics, structure and 
materials of the device can also give clues of what to expect and how seriously to take the threat.  
However, new technologies always run the risk of introducing new vulnerabilities and should be 
a high priority for heavy-ion testing to characterize any SEE modes. 
4.4 Threat Identification: Mitigation vs. Robust Design 
The previous discussion raises the question of where to draw the line between threat 
identification and threat evaluation.  While it is true that a threat is identified as soon as the 
potentially vulnerable technology is slated for a use in an environment likely to realize the threat, 
not all threats are equal.  If we know a part is fabricated in a technology that is highly susceptible 
to SEL, it should be a higher priority for attention than a part from a technology that has never 
exhibited SEL.  Thus, the initial threat determination should use all information readily available, 
and if this allows threats to be ranked, evaluation and mitigation resources can be applied to 
maximize risk reduction for the mission.   
     Similarly, there are several reasons why it may make sense to design in mitigation for various 
SEE even before we know for certain that the susceptibility is present in the design.  First, 
certain SEE modes are quite common in some part types—for instance if we have an SDRAM, 
we can expect it to exhibit SEFI block errors and SEU.  Second, many mitigation measures 
ameliorate the effects of an SEE rather than reducing the chances of its occurrence.  These can 
often be straightforward to implement and have little impact on performance or other factors.  
Finally, some mitigation strategies are much easier to implement early in the design process than 
later on.  There is also the question of the criticality of the application and the requirements for 
the mission.  If a particular function absolutely must work, it may be worth purchasing some 
insurance against failures whether they are realized or not.   
     Looked at in this way, the SEE hardness assurance seems less a three-step process than a 
recursive effort loosely broken into threat identification, evaluation and mitigation.   
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5 SEE Threat Evaluation 
Threat evaluation is usually the process that takes up most of the time in an SEE analysis.  Threat 
identification is usually straightforward for most devices.  Threat mitigation approaches are 
fairly standardized (at least in concept, although they may pose challenges in implementation), 
but expensive.  As such, the threat evaluation stage is needed to ensure that finite resources for 
mitigation are expended to reduce SEE risk in an efficient manner.   
     Threat evaluation is a process of gathering information that may change the initial threat 
assessment.  The information may be about the part, the application, the mission requirements, 
the environment or anything else that affects mission risks.  The information may be gathered by 
part testing, discussions with design and other responsible engineers, discussions with part 
manufacturers and suppliers.  If test data for the part already exist, this historical data can be 
assessed for applicability, or if there are data for similar parts, they can be assessed to determine 
whether they place a meaningful bound on part performance.  All of these efforts have costs, and 
the goal is to reduce risk via the most economical path. Often, the first effort is made in gathering 
as much information as possible about the application from responsible engineers and about the 
part from vendors and parts engineers.  Not only is this effort fairly straightforward, it also 
provides useful information that will be useful in later assessment and mitigation efforts.  SEE 
testing is often an expensive, so after obtaining a full understanding of the application, the next 
task is often the hunt for prior test data on the part or on similar parts. 
5.1 Historical Data 
If you are very lucky and have lived a virtuous life, you may find that someone else has tested 
the very part you want to fly.  If life were fair, you would be done.  Unfortunately, as parts have 
become more complicated, SEE test results have become more application specific.  Unless the 
application is the same, or unless one understands how to extend the test results to the 
application in the current mission, the data can serve only as a rough guide for expectations of 
SEE performance.  This has made it even more important to understand data in context and to 
understand the sources of the data. 
5.1.1 Sources of Historical Data 
Because radiation effects is a small, specialized field, sources for radiation test data have 
traditionally been limited to journals of record (e.g., IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science) and 
conference and workshop proceedings (e.g., IEEE NSREC Radiation Effects Data Workshop, 
SEE Symposium, RADECS, etc.).  The IEEE XPLORE search tool provides access to most of 
these resources.  Also, Dave Hiemstra’s summary of the parts with test data in the previous 
year’s REDW appears the following year.  Other conventional sources of radiation data include 
the radiation group websites for space exploration agencies (some require registration to look for 
data).   
     As SmallSats have proliferated, some have sought to increase their reliability in the space 
environment, so they have begun to produce radiation test data.  Most of the test data uses only 
protons, but because SmallSats tend to use more COTS parts than conventional platforms, 
SmallSat conference proceedings are a good place to find what limited data may exist on such 
parts. In addition to the above suggestions, the right key words in a web search can sometimes 
turn up a resource the above suggestions would have missed.   
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Once the data are in hand, the analyst must evaluate it to determine whether it is representative 
for the flight parts and if so, what it says about likely flight part performance.  Table III 
summarizes some of these source. 
 
Table III: Sources of SEE Test Data 
Data Source Data Found There Website Address 
IEEE XPLORE Mainstream Rad Effects Data 
(NSREC, TNS, REDW) 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ 
GSFC NASA 
Database 
Test reports for GSFC 
Projects/Programs 
https://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/ 
JPL RADATA Test reports for JPL 
Projects/Programs 
https://radcentral.jpl.nasa.gov/ 
 
ESCIES data 
base 
Test reports for ESA missions  https://escies.org/labreport/radiationList 
 
ARC Search 
Page 
Publications of AIAA and other 
SmallSat related venues 
https://arc.aiaa.org/search 
Web search You’d be surprised what you can 
find! 
Your favorite web browser, 
Google Scholar may help 
 
5.1.2 Using Historical Data 
Having found historical data for the part being investigated, it is tempting to declare victory.  
However, quality checks on the data must be performed to ensure it is suitable for the application 
of the part (see Figure 5-1).  Usually, part-to-part and lot-to-lot variation of SEE susceptibility 
are treated as negligible, and in most cases this assumption is borne out, especially for 
nondestructive SEE.  Since destructive SEE involve parasitic structures and/or processes that do 
not occur during normal operation of the part, there is less confidence that variations—especially 
lot-to-lot—will be negligible.  For example, in recent testing of two samples of a DDR3 
SDRAM, the data suggested well over two orders of magnitude in the stuck bit rate [64].  
Moreover, for destructive SEE, one also has the challenge that statistics may be poor, and—if 
statistics for each part are poor—it may be difficult to distinguish between part-to-part variation 
and Poisson fluctuations in fluence to failure.  If part-to-part or lot-to-lot variation cannot be 
neglected, the qualification becomes much more complicated, and using historical data instead of 
testing is not recommended. 
     Even if we expect limited variability, there is still the question of whether the test is 
sufficiently general to cover the application for the current mission.  As mentioned above, SEE 
test data are often application specific.  Complicated devices such as DDR SDRAMs have so 
many different modes of operation that testing in all of them may not be feasible.  SEE rates in 
processors will depend on the algorithm being executed, while SEE susceptibilities in 
programmable devices (e.g., FPGAs) will depend on device configuration.  SET rates, 
amplitudes and durations can be strongly dependent on applied voltages.  If one is operating the 
device in the same or a very similar manner as the test for which the data were collected, the data 
may still serve to bound expected SEE rates and effects.   
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Figure 5-1: Flow chart for using historical data  
 
If there are multiple test data sets enveloping mission application conditions, SEE performance 
may be bounded by constructing a statistical model of the variability.  Alternatively, if the 
dependence of the SEE mechanism on the relevant application conditions is well understood, it 
may be possible to use a physics-based model to bound flight-part performance.  Statistical 
models play a much greater role when discussing how to bound SEE performance for a part 
using data for other parts with similar designs fabricated in the same process. 
5.2 Using Proxy Data to Bound SEE Susceptibility 
A proxy variable for flight-part SEE performance of a device is a quantity that is not directly 
relevant to that performance, but which correlates with the SEE performance sufficiently well 
that we can infer it from the behavior of the proxy.  Since, in reality, we can never measure flight 
part SEE performance until the mission is underway, any data we use to infer such performance 
is a proxy.  The test conditions will always differ from the actual mission environment, and we 
will need to use a model to move from proxy data to the quantity that interests us.  Even heavy-
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  33 
ion SEE test data are collected in an environment very different from the space environment:  
accelerator flux rates are much higher, and the accelerator provides a single ion species at a time 
with a given energy and angle of incidence as opposed to the space environment where 1Z92, 
energy can range up to several GeV/nucleon and the angle of incidence can vary over 4 
steradians.  The important question is whether ways the test environment differs from the 
mission environment are important for the quantity that interests us.  For instance, knowing that 
the SV for SEL can extend >30 m into the substrate, we can anticipate that testing with low-
energy ions from a 252Cf source could underestimate SEL sensitivity.  Similarly, because SEE 
testing is destructive, we cannot test the flight parts themselves for SEE susceptibility, but rather 
must test a representative test sample from which we can then infer flight performance using a 
model (yes, assuming that part-to-part and lot-to-lot variation are negligible is a model).   
     One advantage an analyst has in trying to use proxy data for SEE HA is that the goal is not to 
predict, but rather to bound flight-part SEE performance.  This means that the distribution of 
proxy data need not be narrow, but must merely envelop the flight-part performance.  Of course, 
if the distribution is too broad, it will not be possible to generate useful bounds, but this will 
usually be evident from the analysis.  Figure 5-2 illustrates the situation.  The SEE behavior of 
the flight parts may have some small variation (as indicated by the small diameter of the yellow 
circle).  Variation of parts from flight lot or other lots may vary slightly more, but still 
(hopefully) negligibly and so can serve as a stand-in for inference of flight-part performance.  
Variation will likely be significantly greater for “similar parts” fabricated in the same process as 
the flight parts.  Below, we will discuss the use of a statistical model to bound flight-part 
performance from similar parts.  Whether such “similarity data” will produce useful bounds 
depends on how tightly the performance of the similar parts is clustered. 
     As one moves beyond the circle of similarity data in Figure 5-2, it can become more difficult 
to construct useful models for bounding SEE performance.  Technology trends, expert opinion 
and the physics of the SEE mode or of the part can serve as a guide, especially if the SEE 
mechanisms and part functionality are well understood.  We will next look at two proxies for 
heavy-ion SEE susceptibility in the space environment: similarity data and use of protons to 
constrain heavy-ion upset rates. 
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Figure 5-2: Although what we really want to know is how flight parts will behave, the destructive nature of SEE 
testing precludes knowing this until the mission is finished.  As such, flight-part performance is inferred from less 
representative data.  Test data on a sample from the flight lot, historical data for the same part are usually assumed to 
differ from flight part performance that they can stand in for the latter.  Statistical analysis of less representative data 
for similar parts can also bound flight part performance.  In some cases, the physics of the part or failure mechanism, 
technology trends or expert opinion can yield meaningful bounds as well.   
5.2.1 Similarity Data 
When data are not available for a part slated for use in a space mission, it is common to look at 
how similar parts have performed.  However, what constitutes similar and how many different 
parts one should have in the dataset has rarely been defined.  Is it sufficient for the parts to be 
fabricated in the same process (including minimum feature size) and foundry, or should the type 
of part be similar as well, and if so, how similar?  Is a comparator be sufficiently similar to an 
operational amplifier?  The answer to these questions depends on how the data are to be used and 
on the model to be parameterized by the data.  
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     For instance, if one is simply interested in the question of whether SEL is possible for a given 
fabrication process, the analysis is minimal, and gathering as much data on as many parts as 
possible is desirable.  Thus, looking at parts from Analog Devices’ (ADI) 0.6 m CMOS process 
and finding that the AD7664 latches up [43] is sufficient to establish that SEL is a threat for this 
process.  On the other hand, one may look at data for dozens of parts fabricated in ADI’s 
BiCMOS process without finding a single part susceptible to SEL [43], and this does not 
completely exonerate the process.  However, it does increase confidence that the process may be 
immune, and perhaps the risk of not testing the technology could be worthwhile. 
     More quantitative bounds on SEE performance are possible if one looks at how data for 
several similar parts are distributed.  Reference [43] used Bayesian probability analyses to look 
at distributions for SET rates and SET durations for two different families of operational 
amplifiers and constructed distributions that allowed both quantities to be estimated for each 
family at any required confidence.  me The  analysis also looked at SET amplitudes, but found 
that transients going to the voltage rail are sufficiently common that assuming rail-to-rail 
transients is prudent.  The analysis in [43] requires computation of the sample means and 
standard deviations for the rate and duration distributions, so the minimum number of similar 
parts that can be used for this technique is 3, and the quality of the results increases rapidly as the 
count of part types increases.  Figure 5-3 illustrates the process. 
 
Figure 5-3: Determining SEE risk requires determining both the probability of an SEE and the consequences if it 
should occur.  Fitting SET rates to a distribution and selecting the worst case rate for a given confidence level 
defines failure probability.  Consequences can be determined by fitting SET amplitude and duration to a bivariate 
distribution and selecting the appropriate bounding SET profile (amplitude + duration).   
 
Reference [43] also applied this method to SEL data in Analog-to-Digital and Digital-to-Analog 
converters.  However, in this case, the distribution of consequences is uninteresting, as assuming 
destructive SEE to be destructive is usually prudent, and the distribution of SEE rates was too 
broad (spanning >2 orders of magnitude) to produce meaningful constraints for the process.  This 
is likely because SEL is a parasitic process that depends on circuit layout, so whether a particular 
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element is susceptible is somewhat hit or miss.  Even the distribution of onset LET for SEL was 
quite broad for both families—and perhaps even bimodal.   
The previous discussion illustrates that the quantitative methods can yield useful quantitative 
bounds on SEE performance, and even when such bounds are not possible, they yield useful 
information about the parts in the process being analyzed (e.g., that SEL rates may not be 
amenable to statistical treatment using similarity data or that SET amplitudes should be treated as 
rail-to-rail for a similarity data analysis).   
5.2.2 Protons as a Proxy for Heavy-Ion SEE Susceptibility 
Although protons have been known to cause SEE via production of recoil ions from proton-Si 
collisions for over 35 years, the idea of using proton SEE data as a proxy for constraining heavy-
ion SEE vulnerability was first developed in detail in [29].  The method was refined in [30-31, 
65].  The basic idea is that the recoil ions produced by a proton collision are “heavy” ions and 
will leave ionization tracks through SV just like any other ion.  However, as mentioned above, 
whether a proton recoil can be treated like “any other ion” depends on whether the differences 
between the recoil-ion and GCR/SPE spectra are significant for the SEE mode under 
investigation.  One important difference between the proton-recoil and space heavy-ion 
environment is the low energies of proton recoils.  Most recoil ions from 200-MeV protons are 
on the low-energy side of the Bragg peak, making use of LET as a metric problematic unless the 
sensitive volume is shallow.  As such, proton recoil ions tend to underestimate destructive SEE 
susceptibilities due to the deep SV for these SEE modes [32].  One way of compensating for this 
tendency is to assign an equivalent LET (LETEQ) to the recoil ions that takes into account the 
range of the ions relative to the SV depth 
))SV(depth(
E
LET
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dep
EQ 


,        (3) 
where Si is the density of Si, and the depth of the SV is assigned based on what is known about 
the SEE mode and the technology.  Figure 5-4 illustrates that LETEQ has the effect of 
compressing the LET distributions to the left, where SEE cross sections are low, thus decreasing 
the effective fluence of particles that can cause the SEE mode. Using LETEQ, [66] showed that a 
test with 1010 200-MeV protons/cm2 would fail to detect SEL in a susceptible device for all but 
the most favorable SEL  vs. LET curves (that is, low onset LET and rapidly rising with 
increasing LET.  Moreover, when the SV depth was >10 m, detecting SEL was highly unlikely 
regardless of proton fluence or energy.   
      Proton SEE testing faces other challenges as well.  Because recoil ions are produced with 
3Z15, and a range of angles and energies, one cannot know the characteristics of the ion that 
caused a given SEE observed in the device.  Not only does this complicate bounding SEE rates, 
it also makes it difficult to learn more about SEE mechanisms and impossible to optimize an 
SEE test to detect a particular SEE mode, since one cannot tune the beam to have worst-case ion 
characteristics for that mode.  Also, because proton recoils have Z15, and produce few ions w/ 
Z>12 the majority of ions have LET<12 MeV-cm2/mg., leaving one effectively blind to SEE 
susceptibilities at higher LET or Z.  
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Figure 5-4: Equivalent LET, given by equation 3 facilitates comparison between range-limited proton recoil ions 
and GCR, SPE and accelerator ions.  For deep sensitive volumes, LETEQ pushes the fluence distribution to the left, 
where SEE cross sections are lower, presenting a more realistic picture of the efficacy of the ions at causing an SEE. 
 
Perhaps the most significant limitation for proton testing is that only 1 out of every 289100 
200 MeV protons generates a recoil ion, while every proton contributes to TID.  Testing with 
recoil ions adds almost 200 times as much dose as would an equivalent ion LET spectrum 
coming from an accelerator.  The result is that although the proton fluence used for testing seems 
high, the actual number of ions probing the susceptibilities of the device is quite low—e.g. about 
34600 ions/cm2 for a fluence of 1010 200-MeV protons/cm2, or one ion every 2891 m2.  Figure 
5-5 illustrates this situation visually by depicting simulated recoil ion strikes superimposed on an 
infrared micrograph of an Elpida EDS5108 512 Mbit SDRAM.  A fluence of 1010 200-MeV 
protons/cm2 generates only 3 ions in the area shown (an upward fluctuation from a mean of 1.45) 
and does not come close to covering all of the discernibly different features in the micrograph, 
while a typical heavy-ion test run fluence of 107 ions/cm2 does a good job of coverage. 
The recoil-ion fluence—and therefore the coverage of the test—increases with the proton 
fluence.  However, so does TID—a fluence of 107 ions/cm2 requires a fluence of 2.891012 200 
MeV protons/cm2, for a dose of ~141 krad(Si).  One way to accumulate recoil ion fluence 
without dosing the parts is to test, say 10 parts to 10% of the desired cumulative fluence a TID of 
14.1 krad(Si).  This not only reduces TID to each part, but also presents an opportunity to expose 
part-to-part variation if it is present, at least for common error modes. 
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Figure 5-5: Only one out of 289100 200 MeV protons generates a recoil ion.  Thus in the ~6070 m2 area of the 
Elpida EDS5108 512-Mbit SDRAM, a) a fluence of 1010 200-MeV protons generates only 3 recoil hits (an upward 
fluctuation from the mean of 1.45).  b) Compare this to the coverage generated by 107 ions/cm2 typically used in a 
heavy-ion accelerator test. 
 
Other recommendations for improving results when using proton test data to bound heavy-ion 
SEE rates include:  
1) Using LETEQ to interpret results will avoid underestimating SEE susceptibilities, 
especially for destructive SEE modes. 
2) Because proton-recoil ions differ significantly from those in the space environment, it is 
important to understand as much about the parts being tested and the SEE mechanisms as 
possible, so that one can ascertain whether the differences affect susceptibility 
a. For novel technologies where SEE mechanisms may not be well understood, use 
of protons to bound heavy-ion rates is not feasible. 
b. This is especially important when proton testing is done at the board or box level, 
where information on part-level response may not be available and each part may 
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have a different SV depth and so a different fluence vs. LETEQ spectrum. (See 
Figure 5-6.) 
 
3) Because each part tested with protons has a residual upper bound on its failure rate due to 
modes not detected by the test, the bound on a system built with several parts subjected to 
proton testing will scale with the number of parts.  This will be true whether the parts 
were tested one at a time or at the system, board or box level. 
 
Figure 5-6: When testing with protons at the board level, each device on the board—indeed different SEE modes on 
the same chip—may have different SV depths.  This means the same proton fluence may have very different 
implications for the SEE susceptibility for each chip on the board.   
 
5.2.3 More on Proxies 
Discussion of proxies for SEE Hardness assurance could easily merit a short course of its own, 
and the previous sections are intended only to introduce the reader to some more quantitative 
methods for proxies.  As mentioned above, it may also be possible to bound SEE response of 
parts based on the physics of the part and/or SEE mechanism or expert opinion.  In addition to 
protons, it is possible that laser testing [67] and even synchrotron x-rays may be used to bound 
SEE rates for some parts once sufficiently detailed models are developed [68].  The possibilities 
depend on how ambitious the goals are for testing and analysis.  As with any tool, the utility of 
the tool depends on how ambitious the goals of the testing or analysis are.   
5.3 SEE Testing 
If a part performs a critical function, there is no other substitute part known to be SEE hard and 
information available about a part is insufficient to ensure it will meet its required performance, 
SEE testing will likely be the only way to verify its performance.  Because SEE testing is 
expensive, it is usually regarded as a last resort.  However, performing an SEE provides an 
opportunity to tailor the test specifically to ensure that it produces the data needed to ascertain 
the parts suitability.  SEE testing has become has become highly specialized.  Each of the general 
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standards, guidelines and procedures in Table IV details different test methods and conditions 
optimized to detect susceptibilities to different destructive and nondestructive SEE modes.  MIL-
STD-750, Method 1080 is a more detailed test method that takes into account the more 
complicated mechanisms of SEB and SEGR. 
 
Table IV: Governing SEE Test Documents 
 
 
     Outlining best practices for SEE testing is beyond the scope of this short-course segment.  
Not only do the test guidelines do a much better job of providing advice than would a short 
section in a short course, SEE testing could merit an entire short course in and of itself.  In fact, it 
has...actually several in recent years. 
 
Table V: Recent Short Course Segments on SEE Testing 
Year Author Short-Course Segment Title 
2014 P. Roche and 
G. Gasiot 
Facilities and Methods for Radiation Testing 
2013 H. Quinn Challenges of Testing Complex Systems 
2012 J. Pellish Single-Event and Total Dose Testing for Advanced Electronics 
2008 C. Hafer Ground-Based Testing and Evaluation of Soft Errors 
   
The reader is advised to consult these short course segments for more information about test 
methods.  Instead, we look first at the goals of SEE testing for various types of SEE testing and 
rate estimation options.     
5.3.1 SEE Testing Goals 
The purpose of SEE testing is to bound the risk of using the device under test.  As such, ideally, 
the test should reveal the characteristics of the device’s SEE modes and enough information to 
estimate SEE rates.  Consequences may be summarized by a SET amplitude vs. duration plot 
like 3-5, a distribution number of bits upset for MBU/MCU or a qualitative note on whether a 
SEL mode was destructive or whether a SEFI mode required a power cycle for recovery.  The 
data on consequences feeds into assessments of system-level effects of the observed SEE mode.   
In some cases, the precise rate is less important than whether the part is susceptible at all 
and/or whether the consequences of the mode are acceptable.  For example, if mitigation of SETs 
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is to be done via capacitive filtering, how often the SET occurs is less important than the 
duration/amplitude distribution.  If destructive SEE are unacceptable, observation of such a mode 
precludes use of the part.  Or, as for SEB or SEGR, rate estimation may be impractical or 
impossible.   
For SEB and SEGR, the goal is to determine application conditions in which the device is 
susceptible to the SEE failure mode so that they can be avoided in the mission applications.  This 
type of testing can be accomplished with relatively little beam time.  In some cases, a single 
high-fluence irradiation with a high-Z, high LET ion that observes no threatening SEE modes 
may be sufficient to conclude risks are negligible for those modes.  And if SEE are observed…?  
One of the risks of a go/no-go test is that sometimes the answer is “no-go”.  With measurements 
of cross section for only one LET, there is no way to compare response for susceptible devices.  
Finally, although beam time for an SEE test is expensive, the other aspects of the test—
particularly salaries for highly trained personnel—account for more than 50% of the total test 
cost.  For this reason, a single-ion go/no-go test is not common.  Even for SEB and SEGR, 
testing is often carried out with several parts, a few ions and over a range of application voltages.  
For SEE modes where rate estimation is possible, adding even a few additional data points to the 
 vs. LET allows at least rudimentary rate estimation. 
5.3.2 SEE Rate Estimation Methods and Testing Goals 
SEE rates can be estimated in a variety of ways, all of which involve measurement of how 
SEE cross sections change with respect to proton energy, heavy-ion LET or for detailed Monte 
Carlo approaches, combinations of ion species, energy, angle, etc.  In general, the more detailed 
the model, the more data—and the more test time, cost and schedule are required for the rate 
estimation.  
The simplest rate estimation technique is the Figure of Merit (FOM) approach [69].  The 
FOM rate for a given radiation environment (R(ENV)) is given by the equation: 
2
250.
lim
LET
)ENV(C)ENV(R

        (4) 
where C(ENV) is a constant for the environment, lim is the limiting cross section for the SEE 
mode and LET0.25 is the LET at which the cross section reaches a quarter of its value.  The FOM 
approach can be used for proton or heavy-ion SEE rates, and it can yield accuracies within an 
order of magnitude or so of the on-orbit rate.  Nominally, the method requires at least two 
parameters, lim and LET0.25, so cross section should be measured for >4 different LETs, at least 
two of which are on the saturated portion of the curve.  However, the FOM rate will improve 
with more data. 
     The most common rate estimation approach is the Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped (IRPP) 
model of the type used in the CREME96 package.  (Note: In Europe, the OMERE code from 
TRAD performs SEE rate estimations via methods similar to CREME96 [70].)  For this 
approach, the  vs. LET curve is fit to a Weibull (or sometimes a lognormal) form, and the fit 
parameters serve as input for the rate calculation.  The fit for CREME96 requires at least 4 fit 
parameters, including onset LET, LET0, sat and the Weibull width and shape parameters, w and 
s.  However, one can fit to as many as 7 parameters including the SV depth, a funnel parameter, 
and the rectangular dimensions in the plane of the device, x and y.  Thus, the  vs. LET curve 
should include cross sections for  >6 and preferably >9 LET values.   JESD57 [39] discussed the 
appropriate distribution of LETs. 
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The RPP model presumes that several conditions apply.  It presumes that LET is a valid 
metric for parameterizing the dependence of SEE cross section, and that ion LET is roughly 
constant as the ion traverses the device SV.  It presumes that the SV can be modeled as a single 
RPP.  It presumes that nuclear interactions are negligible.  If any of these conditions do not hold, 
the RPP model will not yield accurate rates and a more sophisticated rate estimation such as the 
CRÈME-MC Monte Carlo Rate Estimation package may be a more appropriate choice. 
     CRÈME-MC is a physics-based model that follows the propagation of ions through one or 
more simplified sensitive volumes [71].  The sensitive volumes may be nested or disjoint.  As 
long as they reflect the basic features of the part, and the calculation uses the correct physics 
models, the rate estimation for complicated problems should be improved over CREME96.  
Thus, the emphasis is on defining SV geometry for a sufficient number of LETs, angles, 
energies/depth, etc., that the tally of ions depositing sufficient charge to cause an SEE is 
reasonably accurate.    
The term “reasonably accurate” is intentionally vague.  How accurately the SV must be 
modeled depends on how accurate a rate estimation is required.  Mapping out the SV using ion 
beams over 4 steradians is impractical.  One approach is to use the Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) capabilities in MRED, a more sophisticated Monte Carlo program [72].  If one has such a 
model, it becomes a matter of simulating the response of the part to ions with a range of Z, 
energy and angle and then carrying out heavy-ion testing to validate the model by looking for 
diagnostic responses shown in the simulations—e.g., angular dependence,  vs. LET or 
Energy/Z, and so on.  This method is useful for validating SEE hardening approaches in deep 
submicron CMOS.  Unfortunately, one is unlikely to have such a detailed model for a COTS 
part, as such a model would be considered highly proprietary by the vendor and most COTS 
vendors are unlikely to assist in obtaining one.  Reverse engineering the structures in the part 
may help, but assembling a sufficiently detailed model would be a Herculean task for any but the 
simplest structures. 
    
Figure 5-7  CAD model of a single latch with dielectric materials rendered transparent to show metallization.  
(Courtesy of K. Warren. Adapted from [73].) 
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The use of MRED and CAD models differs from the conventional approach for SEE rate 
estimation in that SEE testing plays no role in the rate estimation or the parameterization of the 
device model.  The model is determined from the CAD drawing.  Based on simulated irradiation 
of this model under various conditions, the analyst keeps track of notable distinguishing 
behaviors over angle, energy, Z, etc.  Then, during the irradiation of the parts, the analyst looks 
whether the behaviors predicted by the model are reproduced in the data.  If the modeling and 
experimental results being compared are quantitative, a goodness of fit criterion can be applied 
to the data to ensure the model accurately reflects the device geometry.  If there are adjustable 
parameters in the model, multiple series of simulations can be carried out across the ranges of the 
parameters, and if a model gives a significantly better fit, it can be selected.  Otherwise, the 
worst-case model for the environment that is consistent with the experimental data can be 
selected or results can be averaged across the models.   
     Another approach that has proven useful, and which uses the much simpler CRÈME-MC 
package, is the nested volume approach [74].  In this approach, the increase in the sensitive 
volume with LET is approximated as a series of RPP nested volumes.  The rectangular 
dimensions of the volume and the efficiency of charge collection in each incremental shell are 
determined from the  vs. LET curve (which roughly follows the usual Weibull form in a stair-
step fashion (see Figure 5-8)).  These nested volumes are then exposed to the radiation 
environment of interest, and if the sum of the charge deposited in each volume weighted by the 
efficiency for that volume exceeds the critical charge, an SEE is tallied.  This approach allows 
one to consider situations where LET varies along the track, nuclear interactions are important, 
etc. while determining the sensitive volume, efficiencies, etc. purely from quantities measurable 
during a heavy-ion SEE test.  In this case, the improvement in SEE rate obtained by adding 
measurements of  at more LET values depends on the shape of the  vs. LET curve.   
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Figure 5-8: For the nested volume rate estimation, dimensions of each volume the the charge collection efficiency in 
that volume are determined from the  vs. LET curve.  
 
5.3.3 Proton SEE Testing 
Although we discussed use of proton SEE test data to bound heavy-ion SEE susceptibilities in 
section 5.2.2, we briefly look at the goals of proton testing for much less controversial task of 
bounding risks of proton-induced SEE.  In general, whether one seeks to bound heavy-ion or 
proton SEE rates, proton testing is much less complicated than heavy-ion testing.  This is 
because high-energy protons cause SEE via recoil ions, and proton beam energy, angle and other 
characteristics only weakly influence the recoil ion.  The distribution of the recoil ions in terms 
of ion energy, angle, Z and LET varies relatively little whether the proton energy is 100 MeV or 
200 MeV.  As with heavy-ion testing, the goals of proton SEE testing are mainly two-fold—to 
reveal susceptibilities and consequences of SEE that can be caused by protons and to estimate 
on-orbit rates due to protons in the mission environment.  There are several ways in which this 
can be done.  The FOM method has also been applied to proton-induced SEE rates, and 
environmental constants C(ENV) have been determined for trapped proton belts in Earth 
orbit.[69]  A more accurate approach is to measure the increase in SEE cross section with proton 
energy.  Then, based on the LET spectra and other characteristics of proton-recoil ions, a rate can 
be estimated.  CREME96 includes the PUP module, which has options for estimating rates 
assuming the cross section follows the Bendel one-parameter[75], Bendel two-parameter[76] or 
Weibull forms.  Since the fits to SEE cross section vs. proton energy may include several 
parameters, a meaningful fit requires measuring the cross section at several proton energies—3-4 
for the Bendel methods and 6 for the Weibull fit. 
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5.3.4 SEE Risk Evaluation: From Data to Rates to Risk 
The previous two sections made clear that the data during SEE testing—or archival data to be 
used—must be tailored to the planned rate estimation methods.  The rate estimation method may 
be as simple as a FOM algebraic calculation or as complicated as a full blown MRED Monte 
Carlo simulation. Ultimately the data must be sufficient to specify the “correct” model.  
Unfortunately, errors in the SEE data may prevent it from fully specifying a single model:  
Poisson errors are inherent to SEE counts, and other errors (e.g., fluence measurement [77]) may 
also contribute.   
When event counts are small, as is often the case when destructive or disruptive SEE modes 
prevent accumulation of statistics, Poisson errors can dominate.  For the CREME96 model, 
Reference [78] proposed that in this situation, the data could be fit using a variation of Maximum 
Likelihood methods called a Generalized Linear Model (GLM).  Assume xpi and xoi are the 
predicted and observed counts for the ith LET, where the xpi are predicted by the model (e.g. 
Weibull form of the cross section with a specified onset LET, LET0, limiting cross section lim 
and Weibull parameters w and s) and xoi were observed during the experiment.  Then we 
construct the likelihood L({xoi}, {xpi}) that the model generated the observed data: 
)x,x(P})x{},x({L oipi
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,      (5) 
where P(xpi,xoi) is just the Poisson probability that an expected event count of xpi fluctuated to 
xoi.  One calculates the likelihood for all parametric values in the model, and the likelihood that 
is maximum is the most probable model in a Maximum Likelihood sense.  Moreover, because 
likelihoods tend to be normally distributed as one moves away from the maximum likelihood 
values of the parameters, any model will agree with the observed data within a given confidence 
C if it satisfies the following condition: 
)parameters#,C(INV*.)L/)C(Lln( MAX  150
2 ,   (6) 
where INV2(1-C, # parameters) is the inverse 2 distribution for the number of parameters in 
the fit (4 for the typical Weibull cross section fit).  We can then select model that yields the 
highest SEE rate of all those satisfying the above inequality and this rate is the worst-case rate 
for confidence level C.  Reference [78] noted that there is nothing about this method that 
precludes use of models other than CRÈME-MC.  As long as the model predicts expected event 
counts for each observed count.  Moreover, there is nothing that requires use of LET for 
parameterization of the cross section—one could even use a multi-dimensional variable space, 
e.g. (Z, energy, angle).  Thus, this method would also be well suited to comparing Monte Carlo 
models.  However, care should be taken that the models being compared have similar complexity 
to avoid overfitting the data. 
     With the selection of the model (or models), one can then estimate the rate for each SEE 
mode observed in testing.  The consequences of the mode can be traced from the part level to the 
system and the consequences to mission requirements assessed.  With the rate and consequences, 
we can specify risk at the part, circuit, system and mission levels, and based on the risk, we will 
decide whether mitigation is required. 
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6 Mitigation of SEE Risk 
Since the goal of any risk mitigation is to reduce the risk, and risk is the product of failure 
probability and failure consequences, it is not surprising that risk mitigations usually focus on 
reducing probability of failure or on decreasing the consequences of failures that occur or, in 
some lucky cases both.  We next consider the options for mitigating SEE, starting first with 
strategies for reducing SEE probabilities and then for reducing SEE consequences.    
6.1 Reducing SEE Probabilities 
As the very concept of reducing SEE probabilities is predicated on knowing something about 
what those probabilities are, it is safe to assume that test data are available for the problematic 
parts.  Probability reduction is a threat avoidance strategy, and most strategies have to do with 
part substitution or avoiding conditions where the threat is likely to occur.  Part substitution has 
probably been the preferred strategy for avoiding SEE, but it relies on a part existing that is SEE 
hard and can meet requirements in the application.  Since there was probably a reason why the 
designers turned to a non-SEE hardened part in the first place, the question is whether anything 
has changed that would make reduced performance due to the substitution more acceptable.   
     If part substitution is not acceptable, it still may be possible to avoid the error/failure mode by 
avoiding applications where the mode is likely to occur.  This is essentially the strategy behind 
the safe-operating voltages to ensure power MOSFETs are not susceptible to SEB and SEGR.  
Similarly, we know that lowering the supply voltage and application temperature are possible 
mitigations for reducing SEL rates.  SETs are usually less likely to cause error if the system 
operates at lower frequency.  However, unless we have archival or test data, we cannot know 
whether the deratings or guidelines are adequate to reduce SEE rates to acceptable levels.  For 
example, latchup in some parts occurs so rapidly that current limitation, event detections and 
power cycling are ineffective for avoiding destructive failure. 
     The mitigations discussed above rely on nothing more than basic knowledge of the SEE 
mechanisms—whenever we can control the factors that contribute to the susceptibility, we adjust 
them to minimize the susceptibility.  Other strategies may be specific to a particular part or part 
type.  For example, the version of the LM139 available in the 1990s was found to have much 
lower susceptibility to SETs when the voltage difference on the two pins was higher.[79]  
Another example is that some DRAMs exhibit much lower SEFI rates if the mode registers are 
refreshed regularly [80]. 
     Thus, the options for reducing SEE probability are limited to part substitution, tailoring 
applications to minimize variability and opportunistic strategies based on test results specific to 
the part in question.  The reader may have noticed that one mitigation is specifically missing 
from this list: redundancy.  This is because redundancy does not reduce SEE rates, but rather 
SEE consequences. 
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Figure 6-1:The SET threshold of the National Semiconductor LM139 comparator exhibits a strong dependence on the 
input voltage difference. (Supply voltage was 13 volts, adapted from [79].) 
 
6.2 Reducing SEE Consequences 
Most SEE risk reduction strategies seek to reduce the impact of an SEE if it occurs.  This can be 
done in several ways, some of which are specific to the part type and some of which are general 
strategies.  We first look at some of the less general strategies and then look at the most general 
strategy for mitigating SEE— use of redundant elements to preserve information or functionality 
in the event of an SEE induced error or failure. In conjunction with the discussion of redundancy, 
we also discuss some strategies that are employed to supplement other techniques (e.g., memory 
scrubbing, bit interleaving).   
6.2.1 Specific Strategies 
If we are mitigating the consequences of an SEE, we are resigned to the fact that it is going to 
occur.  Where we hope to make a difference is by diminishing the consequences of the SEE.  
Two ways of doing this are directly limiting the effects of the SEE at the part, circuit or system 
level, or by facilitating recovery from the SEE consequences.   
     An example of limiting SEE consequences is the use of a SEL protection circuit.  This circuit 
senses the rise in current as the SEL begins and rapidly cuts off power to the device, stopping 
(hopefully) the SEL before it can damage the circuit.  There are several challenges to 
implementing such a circuit.  The first is ensuring the circuit is effective—not only at sensing the 
overcurrent quickly enough to avoid run-away current, but also in proving that it is rapid enough 
to avoid latent damage to the parts.  (See [38] for an account of successful implementation of this 
strategy.)  Another challenge arises from the need to keep the trigger sufficiently sensitive to 
protect the parts while avoiding spurious triggers that can cause outages.   
     Another circuit-level approach mitigates SETs by capacitive filtering, preventing them from 
affecting downstream electronics.  Again, the challenge is to ensure that the filtering is effective 
at stopping the transients while not slowing down the circuit unacceptably.  As a general rule, 
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transients are less likely to propagate through the system if it is not required to perform at its top 
speed.  SETs are more likely to be captured by downstream devices if they are operating at high 
frequency.  Also, some analog-to-digital or digital-to-analog converters exhibit more transients 
corresponding to low-order bits, and the rate can be reduced by masking these.  However, in 
some cases it may not be possible to prevent the SEE mode affecting the system, or in some 
cases, the cost to performance may be too high. 
     If one cannot prevent the SEE from having consequences, the best approach may be to 
facilitate recovery from those consequences.  As can be seen in Figure 6-2, which illustrates the 
recovery process, there are several times that can be minimized to speed recovery.  Event 
detection can be facilitated by watchdog timers; error checking can be implemented on 
calculation results; telemetry monitored for anomalous readings, and so on.  Once the error is 
detected, the recovery can begin.  The mitigation for the recovery process consists of ensuring 
the resources are in place and ready to do what is needed to restore normal operations.  This may 
involve ensuring that the SEE susceptibilities are well characterized so that procedures are in 
place for an efficient recovery.  If the failure mode is very disruptive, it may involve ensuring 
resources can be dedicated to restoring the system configuration. For the final time increment—
from recovery to restoration of full operations, the main issue is ensuring that verification of 
system status, health and safety are carried out efficiently—which again is facilitated by 
understanding the error/failure modes and systems for the hardware. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Steps in the process of recovery from an anomaly. 
6.2.2 Redundancy and Supporting Strategies 
Because the direct consequences of a SEE are confined to a single die, redundancy—in one form 
or another—can be used to mitigate any SEE mode in a system.  Unfortunately, using 
redundancy to harden against SEE is a strategy that can fail if basic assumptions of the method 
are violated: 
1) The error/failures must be independent and occur at a constant rate. 
2) The probability of an error in the interval of concern must be sufficiently low 
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Although these assumptions seem simple in practice, there are many ways in which small 
changes can seriously reduce the efficacy of the mitigation.  As an example, a DICE latch, which 
relies on redundant, interlocking nodes to provide SEU hardening, may work fine in 90 nm 
CMOS, but fail when implemented at 45 nm CMOS because the increased proximity of the 
redundant nodes in the latter process makes simultaneous strikes more probable (violating 
assumption 1).  Similarly, upsets may be correctable with EDAC as long as the memory is 
scrubbed more than once per day, but may accumulate and cause system-level errors for less 
frequent scrubbing—the error probability in the scrubbing interval is too high for the redundancy 
to help at the system level (violating assumption 2). 
     Redundancy can be used to mitigate any SEE that occurs, provided that the above criteria are 
met and the cost to the system in terms of size, weight, power, performance and complexity are 
acceptable.  However, one must carefully consider the consequences of the SEE one is trying to 
mitigate in designing the mitigation strategy.  For instance, a SEFI can result in loss of both 
functionality and of data integrity for large blocks of data.  EDAC or triplicate voting may be 
sufficient to restore the data.  However, if restoring functionality of the affected device requires a 
power cycle, this could result in the loss of even more data.  Restoring both functionality and the 
data requires a much more complicated intervention and system architecture than merely 
maintaining functionality.  Similarly, redundant devices can provide protection against 
destructive failure, but if they are also used as part of a triplicate voting system, when one of the 
parts fails, all error correction capability is lost, despite the fact that there is still one redundant 
part.  Not only that, but the triplicate system has roughly three times the probability that a failure 
will occur, since all the parts must be biased to provide error correction capability.  The morale 
of these examples is three-fold: 
1) The goal of the mitigation needs to be defined carefully, and one needs to pay in the coin 
of the realm—extra samples to mitigate samples corrupted by an SET, extra bits (in 
EDAC or voted in triplicate) to correct SEU, extra devices stored “cold” (unbiased) to 
replace failed devices—or—stored hot to maintain functionality when one device suffers 
a SEFI). 
2) The likely performance of the devices must be sufficiently well understood, that it can be 
verified that they will meet the assumptions required for effective redundancy above.   
3) For redundant systems, it is important that the environments for which device 
performance is analyzed should include the worst-case environment.  This is because in a 
system that uses n parts where m parts are required (n>m, termed n-for-m redundant), the 
system failure rate scales nonlinearly with the part-level rate.  Thus, if part-level rate rises 
by a factor of 10 in a moderate solar particle event, the system-level error rate can rise by 
100x or more. 
Below, we give some examples of mitigation relying on redundancy that illustrate these points. 
     The thing about SETs is that they are transient—the output of the device eventually returns to 
normal.  Thus, sampling the output of the device three times on a timescale significantly longer 
than the transients the device exhibits and combining the three results (note that the combination 
could be by voting the results for digital outputs, taking the median or the average, depending on 
the characteristics of the errors).  Alternatively, one can compare the outputs of three separate 
devices and vote them the same way.  In this case, the redundancy relies on the fact that 
simultaneous errors in two different devices will be rare, so the system sampling rate is not 
reduced.  The triple-device voting scheme in Figure 6-2 also works for SEU, although the voting 
logic must correct the erroneous device. 
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Figure 6-2: SETs can be mitigated either by resampling the output of the device and voting or voting multiple 
devices.  Actually, depending on the nature of the transient, the noise on the signal, it may be most advantageous to 
take the mean, median or mode (winner of the majority vote) of the signal. 
 
     For digital data stored as data words or blocks, error detection and correction algorithms 
(EDAC) [81], such as the Hamming code depicted in Figure 6-3 [82], may be a more efficient 
error correction solution.  Such algorithms allow a finite number of bits or groups of bits 
(nibbles, bytes, symbols…) to be corrected.  For instance, the Hamming code with 4 data bits 
and 3 error-correction or parity bits can correct any single-bit error. In general, a Hamming code 
can correct a single bit in a word of 2n-n-1 bits by adding n additional parity bits.  Adding one 
more bit allows detection but not correction of any two-bit errors.  The problem with Hamming 
codes is that they can generally only correct a single bit in error, making MBU, block errors and 
SEFI uncorrectable.  More sophisticated EDAC schemes, such as the widely used Reed-Solomon 
code [83], detect and correct errors in blocks of code (e.g. nibbles, bytes, symbols…) and can 
correct any number of errors in these blocks.   
     However, even for such powerful algorithms, block errors and SEFIs can overwhelm the 
code.  For this reason, EDAC is usually paired with additional measures to prevent errors from 
exceeding the capacity of the EDAC.  Scrubbing the memory to detect and correct errors before 
they accumulate over time is effective provided the scrubbing rate is significantly faster than the 
error rate.  However, because the error rate can increase by orders of magnitude for a large SPE, 
it is important that the scrubbing rate is sufficient to handle such conditions if the system is 
required to operate through them.  Another measure often combined with EDAC is interleaving 
of bits in each word across multiple die.  Because the effects of a SEE are confined to a single 
die, as long as the maximum number of bits in a word, block or symbol on a given die are fewer 
than the correction capability of the EDAC, any error mode will be recoverable in principle.  In 
practice, if the memory is volatile and if a power cycle of the system is required to recover 
functionality, all data will be lost.  It is often impractical to implement the ability to cycle power 
to individual memory die, memory modules or even single boards.  As such, if a part requires 
such a power cycle to recover from a SEFI mode, this can often drive the error rate and/or the 
design of the system.  As such, it is important to avoid such susceptibilities.  In some SDRAMs, 
for example, frequent rewriting the mode registers of the device is sufficient to reduce the rate 
for SEFI requiring a power cycle to undetectable levels [80].  Alternatively, large memory blocks 
can be implemented with nonvolatile memory if the lower write and access speeds are tolerable.  
This allows power to be cycled—or even turned off when not in use—without loss of data.   
     Although it may seem complicated to implement scrubbing and interleaving in the memory, 
the payoff is that one can achieve detection and correction of errors equal to or better than 
triplicate voting with a fraction of the overhead.  A Reed-Solomon algorithm capable of 
correcting any errors occurring in two 4-bit nibbles can be implemented with 50% overhead, 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  51 
compared to the 200% overhead of a triplicate voting system.  It is thus possible to achieve a 
high level of data integrity, as long as the cost in system size, weight, power, complexity and 
performance are acceptable.  However, as indicated by the discussion of power cycling to 
recover functionality, data integrity is only one of the issues that mitigation must address.  
 
 
Figure 6-3: A Hamming code (7,4) is among the simplest error corrections codes, but it illustrates the basic ideas 
underlying such schemes.  Three parity bits are determined by combinations of 3 data bits such that if any one bit 
(parity or data) upsets, a unique parity-bit combination will be in error.  Unfortunately, for two upsets, the 
configuration will still be valid.  However, a fourth parity bit, determined from the 3 other parity and 4 data bits, 
allows detection but not correction of two errors.  A single-error correcting (SEC) Hamming code can always 
become a single-error correcting, double-error detecting (SECDED) code by adding such a single parity bit. 
 
     As discussed in Section 3, SEE may have several different consequences other than 
corruption of data.  Destructive SEE can cause catastrophic failures resulting in loss of 
functionality, system availability or even the mission.  SEFI modes can cause loss of system 
availability and can be result in prolonged and disruptive recovery processes that can themselves 
affect system availability, data integrity and other performance metrics.  Redundancy can be 
used to meet system reliability and availability requirements, but there are trade-offs between 
these goals.  Figure 6-4 illustrates the reasons for this.  If the purpose of the redundant device is 
to replace a primary that fails due to DSEE, usually the redundant device is unbiased (cold) and 
so not susceptible to the failure mode.  No more than one device is biased at any given time.  On 
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the other hand, for a redundant device to mitigate loss of availability, it must be in the same state 
and performing the same function as the primary device.  As such, it must be powered and 
operating, and it will be susceptible to the same SEE modes—particularly destructive SEE—as 
the primary device.  Thus, if the primary device were susceptible to DSEE at a rate of , the 
system, including primary and redundant devices, will have an expected rate of 2.  The effects 
of the increased system rate depend on the redundancy of the system and on the DSEE rate of the 
part.  For instance, a 2:1 system will always be more reliable than the single-string system if the 
expected number of failures is less than 1 per mission, while a 4:3 system (e.g. a triplicate voting 
architecture with a 4th string to replace a failed primary) becomes less reliable than an individual 
string (which, admittedly, cannot correct errors) if the expected number of DSEE in the mission 
is as low as 0.184.  As such, in a 4:3 system, keeping the fourth device as a cold spare would 
yield a more reliable system, while a hot spare provides a system with greater availability.   
 
Figure 6-4: Reliability and availability are competing metrics with respect to redundancy.  a) If a triple redundant 
scheme is configured with cold spares, only one device is susceptible to failure (with rate ) at a time, and 3 
independent failures are required for system failure. However, if the primary fails, service becomes unavailable until 
the primary can be isolated and the redundant unit mapped in.  b) For a triplicate system configured to maximize 
availability (and/or data integrity), all three devices are biased and so vulnerable to failure (rate=3).  c) A cold 
spare system requires isolation of the failed device in this case using a buffer [84]. 
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6.3 Putting It All Together 
As discussed above, although a single mitigation technique may not provide the SEE hardness 
desired, combining techniques can produce a very robust system, provided the conditions for 
redundancy to be effective are met and the cost, performance, power consumption, size and 
complexity of the system are acceptable.  Figure 6-5 illustrates this process, including the 
multiple ways in which redundancy is used.   
     First, memory hardening is implemented.  The primary mitigation for the memory is EDAC.  
However, because EDAC can only correct a certain number of bits in error, scrubbing must be 
implemented, and bits in data words may must be interleaved across die so that no single SEE (or 
no two… depending on desired hardness) can corrupt more bits than can be corrected by the 
EDAC.  If the parts are susceptible to destructive SEE, additional memories may be needed so 
the system meets its end-of-life requirements.  These extra memories may be cold spares or hot if 
the failure rate allows.  The scrub rate for the memory must be fast enough that the probability of 
errors accumulating is negligible.  Ultimately, the success or failure of these mitigations depends 
on the underlying performance of the memory chips.  It their error or failure rates are too high, 
the requirements for EDAC, system architecture, scrubbing and redundancy will not be feasible.   
      Mitigating options for processors and similar parts are more limited.  Data are used actively 
and change too rapidly for EDAC to be an option, so triplicate voting is often the only mitigation 
feasible.  Each processor performs identical processes on data fed synchronously from memory, 
and then the output is voted bit by bit.  Depending on the susceptibilities of the processors, the 
redundant processor (PR in Figure 6-5) may be configured as a cold spare to mitigate a processor 
failure (due to DSEE or any other cause), or it can be “hot”—biased, processing data and either 
voting in a quad configuration or “silent” until another processors fails or becomes unavailable.   
     The example in Figure 6-5 illustrates the point made in Section 6.2.2—mitigation costs must 
be paid in the coin of the realm.  For the memories, the coin is data, and we are paying in 
redundant bits for EDAC (or for triplicate voting of memories; we would still be providing extra 
bits…just many more of them).  For the processors, SEE can manifest in multiple ways: 
1) Data errors may occur while executing programming, giving rise to errors in the output. 
2) Programming of the part may become corrupted, producing streams of erroneous data 
3) The part may simply cease to function, but recover when reprogrammed. 
4) The part may cease to function, but recover when power cycled and reprogrammed. 
5) The part may fail catastrophically. 
Triplicate voting mitigates the data errors.  If one processor stops functioning, the remaining two 
continue to provide an accurate data stream.  However, the system has lost error correction 
capability.  The redundant processor preserves that capability—either keeping it available if the 
spare is hot or preserving system reliability against destructive failures for a cold processor. 
     The above simplified example has deliberately omitted some of the most challenging aspects 
of implementing such a system.  For example, ensuring timing is coordinated for all the 
processors is challenging.  Even if a power cycle were not required to restore functionality to a 
processor that had suffered a SEFI, one is likely required to ensure the processors come into 
synchronization. 
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Figure 6-5: For a radiation tolerant system, multiple SEE mitigation techniques are combined.  EDAC, scrubbing, 
bit interleaving and other mitigations can be applied in the memory elements.  Processors are usually voted in 
triplicate, and redundant processors and memories (hot or cold) can be used to ensure availability or reliability.   
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7 SEE Hardness Assurance for SmallSats 
The thing that sets SmallSats apart is not their size (Sputnik was small, after all), but the 
capabilities that can now be fit into such a small package and the speed with which they can be 
developed.  Indeed, the fact that many SmallSats are secondary payloads makes rapid 
development essential, because if they miss their ride or if they don’t fit in their allotted space, 
they stay home.  This elevates the importance of schedule and of packing performance into a 
small size.  Moreover, not having the cost of a launch is not in the equation changes the scale of 
the budget—a $50000 SEE test assumes a greater significance when the project does not face a 
$10 million launch cost.  It is not just that SmallSats have lowered costs for spaceflight, but 
rather they have made missions possible that were previously inconceivable and allowed 
satellites to be built by designers for whom it would have previously been unthinkable.  A 
conventional satellite that flew only one instrument or that had a mission length less than two 
years would probably not be viable.  A conventional satellite would be beyond the aspirations of 
a university. 
     However, to make these new missions possible, SmallSats have to play by different rules.  
They are bound to be more heavily reliant on COTS parts and systems.  Their lower budgets 
mean smaller staffs, so a full-time radiation specialist is not feasible.  Of necessity, a lower 
budget will also mean less SEE testing.  On the other hand, the lower costs of the mission are 
conducive to taking more risks, which could in theory lower SEE HA costs.  In this section, we 
look at why it has proved difficult to realize such savings.  We begin with a look at why 
hardening SmallSats is desirable.  We next look at the how SmallSat reliance on COTS parts 
limits options for evaluating and mitigating SEE risk, how the cost structure of SEE testing make 
it difficult to trade risk tolerance for cost savings and then discussing how the concept of risk 
applies to SmallSats.   
7.1 Why Harden SmallSats 
To date, most SmallSats have been sponsored by universities, and their goals have been as much 
about pedagogy as about science or exploration.  The short development time and mission 
duration have been well suited to student’s timelines for graduation, and if the mission failed, the 
consequences to the pedagogical goals were minimal, and to science, not much worse.  However, 
just as SmallSats have made possible missions that could not be contemplated previously, so too, 
radiation tolerant SmallSats could open up further opportunities, allowing SmallSat missions not 
just in more severe radiation environments, but also longer SmallSat missions that could produce 
time-series data of significant value.   
     Swarms of SmallSats could deploy instruments in a range of different orbits, allowing 
measurements of data (e.g., planetary magnetic fields) over much of a planet and potentially 
producing valuable time series of data.  Unfortunately, the value of a time series of data often 
increases nonlinearly with its duration, and splicing data series over multiple missions and 
multiple instruments is a tedious and error-prone task.  Thus, SmallSats capable of missions of 5 
years or longer could be far more valuable for science than those capable only of shorter 
missions.   
     There could also be significant value in extending SmallSat missions into harsher space 
environments.  Unfortunately, not only would this increase SEE rates for these mission, it also 
takes much longer for the orbit of a satellite at higher altitude to decay than it does for one at low 
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altitude.  Current SmallSat protocols call for cubesats to make provisions to decommission or 
deorbit within a finite time of the end of the mission.  However, if a SmallSat were to fail 
prematurely due to an SEE, it might not be able to carry out the deorbit protocol, and today’s 
SmallSat becomes tomorrow’s orbital debris.  Thus it is critical that at end of life the SmallSat 
retains sufficient control to end its mission according to plan. 
     Finally, because SmallSats have higher risk tolerance, they can fly new technologies that 
promise significant performance, but which have no flight heritage and would be difficult to test.  
However, the SmallSat must be reliable enough that the new technology can be assessed over a 
long enough period of time—and preferably in a severe enough environment—to serve as 
meaningful heritage for future missions.   
7.2 Challenges for SmallSat SEE Hardness Assurance 
SmallSats pose special challenges for SEE HA by their very nature.  The schedule and cost 
constraints favor the use of COTS.  The size and power constraints limit the mitigation schemes 
that are acceptable.  Finally, the cost and schedule constraints limit the amount of SEE testing 
that can be done, and the cost breakdown of SEE testing limits the extent to which risk tolerance 
can be leveraged into saving on SEE testing.  We address each of these challenges in turn. 
7.2.1 Implications of Using COTS Parts and Systems 
The considerations discussed above make it clear that even coming out of the gate, before risk 
tolerance or cost of the system enters the equation, SmallSats will be predisposed toward use of 
COTS.  The ability to purchase parts off the shelf means that the project will not have to worry 
about long lead times typical for radiation-hardened components, nor about schedule if those 
delivery dates slip.  The high integration and capabilities of commercial parts are well suited to 
packing a lot of performance into a small package.  Finally, the significantly lower costs of 
COTS parts are more compatible with budgets of most SmallSat builders.   
     Unfortunately, the high-performance hardware inside SmallSats must perform in a harsh 
radiation environment for which it was not designed, and missions are moving into harsher 
environments all the time.  The surest way to ensure reliability would be to test every unfamiliar 
part.  However, this would blow a giant hole in the budget of even a National Asset class 
mission, and is almost certainly out of the question for a low-budget SmallSat.  It is instructive to 
step through the conventional SEE HA as it would apply to a typical SmallSat, recapitulating 
Figure 5-2 as a guide.   
1) The first order of business would be to scrub the parts list for parts with unknown 
radiation performance or that are likely to pose SEE risks due to their technology.  In the 
conventional SEE HA, each of these parts would be a candidate for testing if the SEE 
concerns could not be alleviated by other data. 
2) The next task would be to search the literature to see if anyone else had tested the part.  
Unfortunately, SmallSat builders who are most likely to use COTS parts do relatively 
little radiation testing, and there are often so many commercial options that the 
probability of finding test data on most parts is small.  Conventional satellite builders 
typically do more testing, but use COTS in small numbers, so again, the most likely 
outcome is that the search will come up empty.  Moreover, most commercial parts have a 
product life cycle less than a couple of years, so the shelf life of any data available is 
likely short.  This step is unlikely to provide significant reductions to the list. 
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3) Having failed to find data for the selected part, the next resort would be to look for data 
on “similar” parts.  The same factors cited in step 2 also suggest that similarity data will 
be hard to come by.  Moreover, it can be very difficult to obtain specific process data for 
a part from a commercial vendor.  Indeed, the vendor may not even know which of 
several foundries a part was manufactured in.  Although automotive grade parts are more 
tightly regulated, they may be reluctant to spend time with a project that is buying less 
than 10 parts when their typical customers order 10s of millions.   
4) If, as is likely, no similarity data are available, the options are to try to bound risk based 
on part technology, physics of failure or expert opinion.  As mentioned above, obtaining 
part technology data from COTS vendors may be difficult.  Not only will the orders by a 
typical SmallSat project be puny compared to those of their typical customers, but the 
company may consider process information and even the foundry in which the parts are 
made to be proprietary.  Even if this information can be obtained, the lack of previous 
SEE testing of the technology may preclude knowledge of the physics of failure.  Finally, 
even relying on expert opinion a fraught proposition.  As mentioned above, a small 
project is unlikely to be able to retain experts, and experts may be reluctant to opine on a 
technology for which little data are available.  (Indeed, the opinion of an expert who was 
willing to speculate under such circumstances might be of questionable value.) 
Thus, it is unlikely that the list of parts of concern for a SmallSat will be winnowed down 
significantly by a conventional SEE analysis.  One approach in the face of such uncertainty 
would be to implement a very tolerant design, in which devices are assumed to be susceptible a 
priori.  However, the size and power constraints may pose limits as to what mitigations are 
acceptable. 
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Figure 7-1: Bounding SEE risk for COTS parts is difficult because the lack of radiation test data, profusion of parts 
and vendors and short product life cycle limit the amount of data available for understanding SEE risks for such 
parts. 
7.2.2 Limitations of Tolerant Design for SmallSats 
Although mitigation strategies for SEE are well understood, not all mitigations are equally easy 
to implement, and the size and power limitations of SmallSats further complicate the process for 
some strategies.  Even with large satellite projects, tolerant design in the absence of device-
specific data means, for example: 
1) Derating power MOSFET VDS to 20% of its rated value if one does not have data on the 
part, as SEB failures have been seen down to 22% of the rated VDS for commercial parts 
[48];  
2) Implementing capacitive filtering sufficient to filter the >1 ms transients seen in the 
LTC6268 data in Figure 3-5; 
3) And so on, as without data, designers must implement mitigation based on worst-case 
parts observed in past testing. 
While such defensive design may result in unacceptable performance penalties, the only way to 
show that they are not needed is via test or proxy data (e.g., similarity).  For SmallSats, some 
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measures are relatively easy to implement—e.g., watchdog timers, error, checking—while others 
are much more difficult.  Cold sparing may strain size limitations, while triplicate voting may 
bump against limitations of size or power.  Memory requirements for the mission may be too 
small to interleave memory words over the requisite number of die to avoid overwhelming 
available EDAC.  Moreover, while it may be possible to implement triplicate voting among the 
cores of a multi-core processor, most current processors share common cache amongst the cores, 
leading to possible common failure modes.  The extent to which these failure modes manifest for 
a particular processor could perhaps be revealed by fault injection, but without an SEE test 
validation, such a solution could still yield unpleasant surprises.   
     As noted above, destructive SEE often pose the most significant radiation related risks for 
short-duration mission.  In addition, it is very difficult to predict from process/similarity data or 
other proxy data which parts are most likely to exhibit significant susceptibilities to DSEE.  
Mitigation of DSEE by derating to safe operating conditions may pose significant penalties for 
power efficiency or performance, and cold sparing can significantly complicate board design and 
take up precious board space.   
     Next in line in terms of difficulty in mitigation are very disruptive SEE, particularly SEFI and 
nondestructive SEL.  These SEE modes likely require a power cycle to recover part 
functionality, and implementing the ability to cycle power only to likely affected devices (e.g., 
memories, processors, etc.) would complicate circuit design unacceptably for most SmallSats.  
As such, recovery usually implies cycling power to the affected board, with the requisite loss of 
data that implies, and then restoring the configuration of the board from an image stored in 
nonvolatile memory.  Whether such a disruptive recovery process is acceptable depends on 
mission requirements.  Whether it can be implemented successfully, depends on how tight board 
space is in the design.  Certainly, it would be advantageous to know whether such mitigation is 
needed before committing to it.  Unfortunately, such knowledge requires SEE testing. 
7.2.3 SEE Test Challenges for SmallSat Missions 
Although the limited budgets of most SmallSats pose significant constraints on the amount of 
SEE testing, they are not the only and sometimes not even the most serious constraints.  In 
addition to being expensive, SEE testing is also time consuming, especially for complex, highly 
integrated COTS parts.  Complex parts require complicated test hardware to measure SEE 
susceptibilities.  Even if all one seeks to determine in an SEE test is whether the part is 
susceptible to SEL, the test hardware must be sufficient to verify whether the part remains fully 
functional during and after the test.  As mentioned above, such a susceptibility test can be carried 
out in a single high-fluence, high-LET test run at a heavy-ion accelerator.  Unfortunately, beam 
time is only one of many costs incurred during an SEE test.  Figure 7-2 illustrates the breakdown 
of the cost (~$80,000) a typical test of a complex device by cost category and phase of the test.   
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Figure 7-2: Although the high cost of SEE testing is driven by many factors, direct costs for beam time are among 
the less significant drivers.  Nearly 70% of test costs are for highly skilled labor, and over 50% of the cost is spent in 
the development phase.  This makes it difficult to realize savings by “simplifying” the test. 
 
As can be seen from this breakdown, 69% of the cost is for labor, with most of this being during 
the test development phase.  Typical beam costs account for only about 15% of the test cost, so 
even if beam time were eliminated entirely, this would reduce the cost by only ~$12 K.  While a 
simpler test would also save money on test development and the savings would exceed ~50%.    
     Although a proton test requires less part preparation to ensure the beam reached the device 
SV, more time may be spent by the radiation analyst finding out about the part technology so that 
the maximum information can be gleaned from the results.  This is particularly important if one 
is trying to constrain heavy-ion susceptibility using proton data.  Moreover, while a proton test is 
simpler (there being only one ion), it is useful to irradiate with several proton energies to 
constrain proton upset rates.  Proton testing at the board or box level can yield significant savings 
over part-level testing.  Moreover, it saves on test hardware, as the test object is usually a flight 
board or box, and sophisticated test equipment is superfluous for a test that yields little data 
except whether test-object performance remains nominal or not.  Also, a board-level proton test 
yields no information on part-to-part variation, little constraint on heavy-ion DSEE risk, and 
results may be challenging to interpret in a way that yields understanding of the SEE modes of 
the parts in the system.  Even accepting these limitations, a board- or box-level proton test of 
complex hardware is difficult to carry out for less than $30-40K.  Costs for proton beam time, 
travel and analysis can easily reach $20 K. 
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     Using lasers for SEE testing can save significantly on beam costs.  However, part preparation 
costs will be as high as if not higher than those for heavy-ion testing, and costs will be similar for 
test equipment, development, execution and analysis.  Moreover, because a laser beam 
illuminates only a small area on a test part for each run, will likely require refocusing several 
times during the test and because results must be tallied for each run, it is unlikely that the tester 
will be able to cover the full die area of a large, complex microcircuit in even a few days of 
testing.  However, laser testing must be done at the level of an individual part (or a portion 
thereof) rather than a board or box, and it may yield limited information on DSEE susceptibility.   
     Thus, limited heavy-ion testing, proton testing, board-level proton testing and laser testing can 
realize some savings at a cost of yielding less information that can be used to infer in-flight 
performance.  However, the savings are limited due to the cost breakdown of SEE testing.   
7.3 Summary 
By their very nature as secondary payloads, many SmallSats are driven to use of COTS parts to 
ensure schedule, size, power and performance constraints and requirements are met.  The fact 
that conventional satellite missions, which do most of the radiation testing, use COTS in limited 
numbers, the short product life cycles and the sheer number of COTS parts available make it 
unlikely that historical data for that part—or even similar parts—will be available.   
     Size, power and performance requirements also limit the sorts of mitigations that can be 
included a priori for SmallSats in an SEE tolerant design. Use of redundancy to ensure reliability 
and availability of satellite services can be difficult to incorporate widely on a board with limited 
space.  Ensuring sufficient derating to avoid failures/errors from worst-case parts can impose 
unacceptable penalties on performance, and monitoring currents and cycling power to avoid 
failures and recover functionality are likely to be unacceptable on a wide scale.  
     Finally, the cost structure of SEE testing makes it very difficult to leverage risk tolerance into 
significant savings for a test that constrains SEE susceptibility in any meaningful way.  Most of 
the costs for SEE testing occur during the development phase, and most go to highly trained 
people developing and carrying out the test.   
     The problem of making SmallSats SEE tolerant is a work in progress.  If there were a way of 
using commercial parts, even with well managed risk, the incentives of using COTS would have 
conventional satellite already doing it.  We discuss some of the partial solutions SmallSat 
builders have been using next. 
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8 SmallSat SEE Hardness Assurance 
In the previous section, we have discussed some of the constraints on SmallSat builders that 
make it difficult to implement a rigorous SEE Hardness Assurance program.  In particular the 
emphasis on schedule and size restrictions strongly incentivizes SmallSat builders to use COTS 
parts, and although conventional SEE HA can handle COTS parts in small quantities where they 
promise a performance advantage worth the cost of qualification, large quantities of COTS pose 
significant SEE risks and are very costly to qualify.  SmallSat builders have responded to the 
SEE challenge with a range of strategies, depending on their resources and their level of 
understanding of SEE.  We outline a few of these below.   
8.1 Buy-It-And-Fly-It 
If a SmallSat’s budget does not permit radiation testing, then the mission itself winds up being 
the radiation test—a strategy somewhat glibly referred to as buy-it-and fly it.  Most commercial 
microelectronics and COTS systems will be susceptible to SEU.  If the electronics has complex 
control and state circuitry, SEFI are a strong possibility, and any time commercial CMOS is 
flown in a radiation environment, SEL is a significant threat.  However, sometimes a builder gets 
lucky.  The probabilities of a lucky break can be enhanced significantly if the hardware has prior 
flight heritage, if the voltages are derated significantly from rated values, and if temperatures are 
on the low side (room temperature down to liquid nitrogen temperatures).  If the mission 
duration is short, the probabilities may work out.  The probability of success can be further 
increased if the mission plans for failures—that is, facilitating error/failure recovery through use 
of watchdog timers, error checking and other techniques discussed in section 6.2.  Judicious use 
on diverse redundancy—e.g., two different radio systems or processors—can also significantly 
improve chances of success, albeit at a cost in size, weight and power that may not be acceptable 
for a SmallSat. 
     If critical deployment and communications components are made sufficiently reliable and 
telemetry is available for the early phases of the mission, even if the satellite fails, it may be 
possible to determine the likely cause of the failure, enabling gradual improvement and greater 
probability of mission success over time.  However, if building a satellite out of commercial 
hardware, there is no guarantee that two purchases of the same system will use the same 
components.  Components that are functionally the same may have significantly different 
radiation behavior.  Moreover, if one chooses two different components (e.g., radio, on-board 
computer, etc.), it is still possible that the systems may be using some of the same components, 
increasing the risks of common failure modes for these systems. In short, drawing reliable 
conclusions about observed failures requires knowledge of each part in the design. 
8.2 The Swarm—Safety in Numbers? 
A Swarm mission is a large number of satellites flying in formation.  Such a mission may 
provide global communications coverage or imaging or scientific data.  If the number of 
satellites in the swarm significantly exceeds the number needed for mission success, then the 
mission success probability can exceed the survival probability a single satellite.  However, such 
a rosy conclusion depends on the same assumptions that underlie all redundancy-based 
mitigations—namely that the failures of each satellite are independent and that the probability of 
failure for any one satellite during the mission is <<1.  If the satellites all have the same design 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  63 
and utilize the same components, they may have a common failure mode.  Even though SEE 
failures are Poisson, if, for instance, each satellite contains the same highly SEL susceptible 
SRAM, that common failure mode may doom the swarm as surely as it dooms a single satellite. 
Also, since Poisson failure rates are additive, the expected number of failures increases linearly 
with the satellites in the swarm.  It is only when the number of failures required for the mission 
to fail significantly exceeds the expected number that the swarm survivability significantly 
exceeds that for an individual satellite.   
8.3 Board- and Box-Level Testing 
As discussed previously in Section 5.2.2, board- or box-level SEE testing with high-energy 
protons can be one of the least expensive options for gleaning at least some knowledge of SEE 
susceptibility of a system.  Testing with protons with energy  200 MeV will reveal most of the 
proton-induced SEE that can occur in the space environment.  It will also reveal some 
information about susceptibilities to GCR and SPE light ions—particularly susceptibilities with 
low onset LET, rapidly rising  vs. LET and shallow SV.  When a SEE tolerant design survives 
a proton SEE test to a relatively high fluence, this does provide some assurance that system is not 
exceptionally susceptible.  However, quantifying how susceptible and the degree of assurance 
can be difficult, especially when testing is conducted at a high level of integration—e.g. at the 
board or box level.   
     We have already discussed some of the limitations of proton testing in general as a proxy for 
heavy-ion SEE susceptibility—mainly the limitations on recoil ion coverage posed by TID and 
the likelihood that protons may not reveal all destructive SEE susceptibilities.  As illustrated in 
Figure 5-6, even inferring the equivalent LET spectrum due to a given proton fluence is 
challenging, and may vary from device to device and even within a device for different SEE 
modes.  In addition, the more complicated the system under test, the more difficult it is to draw 
general conclusions from the test.  In current microprocessors, for example, the number of SEUs 
that give rise to observable effects (errors, crashes, etc.). The unobserved—or silent—faults have 
no observable effect during the test. However, if the same fault occurred when the processor was 
performing a different set of operations the consequences of the same SEU could be different.  
Fault injection studies can provide some measure of understanding of the proportion of faults 
that are silent, but exhaustive simulation of all faults at all stages of operation is not possible.  
For a board or box containing processors, FPGAs, DDR3 SDRAMs and Flash memory, the 
problem of silent corruption is likely to be even more significant.  Thus, to the issue of spatial 
coverage over the die surface(s), one must also add the issue of temporal coverage over the state 
space of the system under test.  Finally, as mentioned above, if components used in the test item 
exhibit significant part-to-part or lot-to-lot variation, this will not be revealed by a test on a 
single board or box.  Even tests of several test units may not reveal the extent of variability or the 
effects that can manifest when these variable parts interact with each other.   
     Moreover, lest the reader conclude that the problems all arise from use of proton recoils as a 
proxy for space-environment ions, figure 8-1 illustrates the difficulty of defining the LET of an 
ion in a board-level heavy-ion test.  The Variable Depth Bragg Peak test method [85] has been 
developed specifically for ultrahigh-energy ion beams like those available at the NASA Space 
Radiation Laboratory.  In this method, the test item is exposed to an ultrahigh-energy ion beam, 
and the upsets are tallied for a small ion fluence.  Then the exposure is repeated with various 
thicknesses of energy degrader, increasing the LET as the ion energy decreases toward the Bragg 
Peak.  When the SEE cross section reaches its maximum and then decreases as more degrader is 
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added, one can conclude this degrader thickness corresponds to the Bragg peak for the ion 
overlapping the device SV.  The method allows SEE cross sections to be measured over a range 
of LETs, from (near) minimum ionizing up to the Bragg peak without changing ions.  
Unfortunately, when testing at the board level, each device on the board may have different 
amounts of overburden over the SV, leading to slightly different LET for each device for a given 
degrader thickness.  In addition, silent data corruption and coverage of the state space can also be 
an issue for ultrahigh-energy heavy ion testing, although ion fluence is less constricted by TID.   
     As mentioned above, the key to board-level testing with either protons or heavy ions is 
knowing as much as possible about the parts on the board prior to the test.  Knowing the 
overburden or SV thickness is key to understanding the LET(s) to which they are exposed.  
Knowing the process of each die and its complexity may assist in developing a better SEE test 
regime, with the entire board exposed to a light fluence of particles sufficient to provide adequate 
coverage for simple devices, and complex devices fabricated in deep submicron (and hopefully 
TID hard) CMOS an additional higher fluence to provide better coverage for the device. 
 
 
Figure 8-1: Varying amounts above the device sensitive volume can result in ions having different LET in different 
devices during ultra-high energy board level testing.  The rapid changes in energy as one nears the Bragg peak 
exacerbate this effect for lower energy beams or thicker overburden. 
8.4 Partnering—Relying on the Kindness of Strangers  
As will undoubtedly be discussed throughout all segments of this short course, SmallSat projects 
labor under significant restrictions not just of budget, but of other resources as well—particularly 
schedule (and so to order long-lead-time radiation-hardened parts) and the ability to consult with 
experts.  If the SmallSat builder can partner with a conventional satellite builder, this can relieve 
some of these constraints.  A conventional builder will retain experts who can provide limited 
consultation on radiation issues the SmallSat builder faces.  There may even be “leftover” 
radiation-hardened parts in stock, saving scarce funds—and more important the risk of schedule 
 To be presented by Raymond L. Ladbury at the 2017 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference  
(NSREC 2017), New Orleans, LA, July 17-21, 2017.  65 
slip due to a late delivery.  In return, the SmallSat builder may be able to fly technology of 
interest to both parties, but which is too risky for conventional satellites.  Thus, the SmallSat 
becomes a technology demonstration mission for the conventional builder, who has an incentive 
to ensure that the mission is at least sufficiently successful that the performance of the new 
technology can be assessed.  Often, the new technology will be employed in a flight computer, 
large-scale data storage or a payload sensor and the associated data conversion and processing.  
The conventional builder may provide a redundant radiation hardened processor for the flight 
computer that can assess system health and performance and send the data to ground.   
     To date, most such missions have been flown by organizations associated with NASA centers, 
Department of Energy Laboratories and other conventional satellite builders.  However, there is 
no reason partnerships could not be formed between the same conventional builders and 
universities or other SmallSat builders.     
 
8.5 Risk-Informed Testing 
If a project has a limited, but nonzero budget for SEE HA, the goal should be to maximize risk 
reduction for the funds that are available.  In the absence of data on the SEE susceptibilities of 
the parts being considered, one cannot determine what risks they pose to the application.  
However, one can work backward from the system level to determine the system consequences 
of various SEE modes, and evaluate the technologies of the parts to assess the likelihood of those 
SEE modes.  Based on these considerations, one can assign a risk for each SEE mode deemed 
credible according to the consequences assuming that mode is realized.  In other words, it is the 
risk assuming the probability of the SEE mode is 1. 
     An example of the risk-informed testing strategy is the Goal Structured Notation approach 
adopted by Vanderbilt University for its … CubeSat experiment.  An example of a Goal 
Structured Notation (GSN) graph is shown in Figure 8-3. 
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Figure 8-2: For risk-informed SEE testing, the reliability analysis defines the parts most significant for the system.  
SEE risk is prioritized bases on the consequences of failure and the credible failure modes for the technology. 
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Figure 8-3: Goal-Structured Notation (GSN) is a formalism for identifying both risks and the means for ameliorating 
those risks.  The approach ties risks to the goals they threaten and encourages assumptions and justifications to be 
stated explicitly.  (Courtesy of Rebekah Austin, Vanderbilt University.) 
8.5.1 Evaluating Failure Consequences for SmallSats 
For the most part, assigning failure consequences is straightforward.  Mission goals and 
requirements can be prioritized as a percentage of the overall mission value.  Thus, if a part 
critical to mission success has credible failure modes, the consequences of its failure could be 
equal to the mission cost.  Indeed, it could exceed the mission cost if it were the cause of a 
mission failure, its responsibility for the failure went undetected and it went on to cause failures 
on future missions.  As such, in evaluating the priority to assign to a given part, one may need to 
consider its potential importance not just for the current mission but also for future missions the 
SmallSat builder may be planning.   
     There is another way in which failure cost can exceed mission cost, especially if a series of 
failures are experienced by the same satellite provider.  At some point, funding agencies may 
simply decide not to throw good money after bad.  This is especially true for conventional 
satellite builders.  If they experience too many failures, their brand may be damaged.  SmallSat 
builders may be less brand conscious, but they cannot afford to fall too far behind their peers in 
terms of reliability.  The converse of this consideration is also true:  If success in a challenging 
mission brings recognition and helps win future contracts and/or funding, the value to the 
satellite provider may actually exceed the value of the mission goals in and of themselves.   
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8.6 Examples 
    One example of the sort of partnership outlined in Section 8.4 is the CIBOLA Flight 
Experiment (CFE).  CFE was funded by the US Department of Energy and developed as a by 
Los Alamos National Laboratory as a technology demonstration platform.  Although the main 
technology experiment involved antennae and radios, the payload computer, which processes the 
payload experiment data is also an experiment in radiation-tolerant, reconfigurable computing.  It 
was one of the first space missions to pioneer the use of commercial reprogrammable FPGAs.  
The computer implements several types of error checking and watchdog timers to detect 
anomalies.  In addition to multiple Xilinx reconfigurable FPGAs to handle the main computing, 
there is also a BAE RAD6000 radiation hardened processor, which supervises payload 
operations.  Volatile data storage is in radiation hardened SRAM.  However, nonvolatile memory 
includes a radiation tolerant EEPROM as well as FLASH.  Nonvolatile memory is used to store 
configuration as well as data in the event configuration in the FPGAs is lost due to SEE.  CFE is 
an example of a SmallSat (albeit a very well-funded one) that did a lot of things right.  The use 
of diverse redundancy, triplicate voting of the FPGAs, inclusion of error checking and watchdog 
timers, selective use of radiation hardened technologies and multiple types of nonvolatile 
configuration storage significantly reduce SEE risk to the payload, either by reducing SEE 
probability or by facilitating detection and recovery from the SEE.   
     Another interesting example from the commercial space sector shows that the concept of a 
“SmallSat” is relative.  The Peregrine lunar lander (see figure 8-4) being developed by 
Astrobotic Technologies is a mission designed to deliver payloads to the lunar surface at a cost 
of $1.2 million per kilogram of payload.  Although the lander is projected to weigh 345 kg dry 
weight, and 1200 kg fueled.  Both the cost and mass are quite lean for a lunar mission.  
Moreover, the mission is planning to launch as a secondary payload, thus reducing the 
importance of launch costs in the budget.  Also, use of redundancy for SEE hardening is not an 
optimal strategy, since every gram of redundant hardware reduces the payload that can be 
carried.   
     Peregrine is being driven to heavy use of COTS parts by cost, schedule, performance and 
mass considerations.  While they plan to leverage off of parts—especially COTS—previously 
tested by the radiation effects community and similarity if they cannot find data on specific parts 
they need, they will also probably be forced to test some parts themselves.  In order to prioritize 
scarce testing resources, Astrobotic Technologies is carrying out a risk-informed approach taking 
into account the criticality of the system, the likely SEE susceptibilities of parts making up the 
system and the relative cost and impact of testing vs. mitigation vs. changing mission 
requirements to reduce risk.  Even with all of this consideration and flexibility, the radiation 
approach for Peregrine is still a work in progress.  For assistance in development of their 
approach, they are working with NASA experts under the Lunar Cargo Transportation and 
Landing by Soft Touchdown (Lunar CATALYST) program—thus adding aspects of partnering, 
risk-informed testing, board/system-level testing and even some buy-it-and-fly-it to their 
approach.   
     Another example of the risk-informed testing strategy is the Goal Structured Notation 
approach adopted by Vanderbilt University for its … CubeSat experiment.  An example of a 
GSN graph is shown in figure 8-3.  In this notation, the goal is stated in the top level and is 
followed by strategies for meeting the goal, derivative goals associated with that strategy and 
assumptions and justifications for the strategies.  One can take issue with the assumptions and 
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justifications—e.g., we have seen that proton testing can underestimate SEL susceptibility—but 
that is the point.  The GSN approach makes a point of explicitly stating the assumptions 
underlying the strategy so they can be evaluated.   
     The examples discussed in this section illustrate that the approaches outlined above are more 
a matter of convenience and a pedagogical aid than a reflection of real SEE HA programs for 
SmallSats.  In reality, a successful program will have to remain flexible and combine elements of 
all these approaches—and perhaps some yet to be developed.   
 
Figure 8-4: Artist’s rendering of the Peregrine Lunar Lander. [Used by permission from Astrobotics.] 
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9 Conclusions 
The previous analysis has emphasized the nature of SEE HA as an example of risk-mitigation 
approach as a pedagogical aide to understanding the challenges of applying the methodology to 
SmallSats and other risk-tolerant platforms.  In short, the problem with risk-tolerant platforms is 
that they take risks, and if the risks are not assessed thoroughly, they can easily wind up 
exceeding their risk budget many times over.  In particular, because SmallSats are secondary 
payloads constrained by schedule, size and power, they are driven to take technical and 
reliability risks by using predominantly COTS parts.  Because COTS parts are designed with no 
consideration of how they will operate in a space radiation environment, and because the 
conventional satellite builders who do most of the SEE testing use and test COTS only sparingly, 
there is little data available upon which to base a SEE risk assessment.  This leaves SmallSat 
builders with a choice of either blowing a big hole in their cost budget by performing extensive, 
costly SEE testing, blowing a big hole in their risk budget by accepting very high risk bounds—
or worst of all, using proxies—e.g. proton test data and/or similarity data—in unrepresentative 
ways that may yield overly optimistic risk estimates.   
     Moreover, SEE HA is already tolerant of risk, in the sense that it bases its assessment of 
threat credibility on known susceptibilities.  I noted in the short course in 2007 that this has led 
to surprises in the past, and it continues to yield surprises now.  As such, it is critical to the health 
of SEE HA that heavy-ion testing continue to be part of the methodology even if SmallSats and 
other risk-tolerant missions assume a larger role.  Semiconductor parts will continue to evolve, 
and we will be blind to new failure modes if we don’t keep looking for them. 
     Finally, SEE HA approaches need to evolve to better leverage risk tolerance to realize cost 
savings for missions with tight economic and schedule budgets, while at the same time 
maintaining a knowledge base of current semiconductor part technologies—from radiation 
hardened through COTS. 
     We will address each of these considerations in turn, first summarizing the issues discussed 
above concerning the difficulty of adapting conventional SEE HA to SmallSats, then revisiting 
the risks inherent in current SEE HA methods and finally looking to the future to consider how 
SEE HA methods could evolve to better address threats to all mission types. 
9.1 Risk Tolerance and SEE Risk Management 
The challenges for SmallSat SEE risk management occur at all levels of the process.  Novel 
technologies may have unknown SEE susceptibilities, and while one can look at “similar” 
technologies as a guide, the conclusions will be uncertain, and in some cases, even the 
determination of what constitutes a similar technology may be uncertain.  In some cases, the part 
chosen may exhibit much greater sensitivity than previous parts [48], or the part-to-part 
variability may exceed previously tested “similar” parts [49].   
     Probably the most salient challenges for SmallSat SEE HA arise due to the difficulty of using 
COTS in space radiation environments.  Conventional satellites face many of the same issues 
regarding COTS use.  However, SmallSats are driven to use COTS parts in large numbers by 
considerations of schedule, size, performance and at least some cases by cost, and SmallSats 
have far fewer resources to apply toward solving them.  COTS use is always challenging for 
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several reasons.  First, commercial electronics is designed to operate in a terrestrial environment 
where radiation is considered to be a minor issue for designers, if it is a consideration at all.  
Second, because conventional satellite builders use COTS only sparingly and because there are 
often many COTS parts that can fulfill a particular function, it is unlikely that a SmallSat builder 
will find prior SEE test data on that part.  Additionally, the complexity of many COTS parts 
means that much of the test data available will be application specific, and the short product life 
cycle for most COTS parts means that SEE test results are nearly worthless after only a few 
years.  The same considerations also ensure that similarity data will be virtually nonexistent.  
Although an analysis may be attempted based on part technology, such analyses rarely yield 
meaningful limits on SEE risk, and the fact that most COTS vendors consider process data 
highly proprietary will limit the information available to the analyst.   
     The complexity, performance and degree of integration of COTS parts also often make them 
more difficult to test than their military and radiation-hardened counterparts.  Packaging and the 
presence of multiple stacked die may prevent ions from a conventional heavy-ion accelerator 
from reaching the device sensitive volumes.  Although proton SEE testing can produce recoil 
ions in device SV, the low recoil ion fluences, lack of knowledge of which ion caused an SEE 
and differences in SV depths make complicate the interpretation of test results.  Indeed, in a 
complex System-In-a-Package (SIP) with multiple die, the same proton fluence may correspond 
to a different fluence vs. equivalent LET for each die.  If the projects opts to test at the board or 
box level, interpretation of the test results becomes even more complicated.   
     Finally, although the approaches to mitigating SEE risks are well understood, the 
consequences of these mitigations in terms of increased size and power consumption or 
decreased performance may not be acceptable for the SmallSat.  Some mitigations, such as 
simple EDAC, memory scrubbing, watchdog timers and error checking, are straightforward to 
implement, and these may be implemented even in the absence of test data for the parts.  On the 
other hand, triplicate voting, hot and cold sparing, interleaving of bits from memory words 
across multiple die and other mitigations may require too much board space to be implemented 
easily for a SmallSat.   
     The problems of implementing economical, risk-tolerant SEE HA for SmallSats seem nearly 
insurmountable.  Indeed, they have yet to be resolved in a satisfactory, comprehensive fashion.  
However, in section 9.4, we will recap some of the approaches developed to date and suggest 
some additional improvements.  Next, we look at some of the new challenges facing SEE HA 
that affect both SmallSat and conventional platforms. 
9.2 Another Decade of SEE Surprises 
Even for conventional satellite platforms, SEE hardness assurance remains a dynamic field.  To 
some extent, this is inevitable when the parts used in satellites continue to evolve at an 
exponential pace.  However, the field has also experienced challenges to many of its fundamental 
assumptions over the past decade.  I noted several of these challenges in my 2007 short course on 
system level radiation hardening.  Table VI notes some of the SEE related surprises of the past 
decade.   
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Table VI: The Latest Surprises in SEE Hardness Assurance 
Rule of Thumb Oops! 
SEL gets better with decreasing 
temperature 
SEL observed in Read-out IC at cryogenic 
temperatures <40 K (Marshall-2010, [42]) 
SEE are not important for diodes Schottky diodes observed to fail catastrophically 
due to previously unknown SEE mechanism.  
(Casey-NEPP Electronic Technology Workshop 
2012) 
If part has no W plugs, no need to 
worry about proton destructive SEE 
if onset LET >20 MeVcm2/mg. 
p+Au fission in packages w/ Au plated lids 
produces ions w/ LET  ~40 MeV-cm2/mg  
(Turflinger-2015, [34]) 
No need to worry about proton-
induced fission if package has no 
high-Z materials  
 for p + Pd (Z=46) fission nearly as high as for 
p + Au (Z=79). Fission seen even for p + Ni 
(Turflinger-2016, [35]) 
 
As can be seen from the table, surprises that challenge fundamental assumptions of SEE HA 
occur roughly every 2-3 years.  In some cases, these affect only niche applications (e.g. there are 
relatively few CMOS applications running at temperatures below 40 K, so cryogenic SEL is not 
a major concern in most missions).  In others, the threat is significant for a few parts when 
particular conditions apply (e.g. the fission events in high-Z materials).  However, in the case of 
the failures observed in Schottky diodes and similar parts, the implications can be profound.  
These observations introduce an entirely new class of parts into SEE HA that could previously 
be ignored.  To date, the failure mode has been seen only in parts biased at >50% of their rated 
reverse voltage, so as long as such a derating is acceptable for the project, mitigation via threat 
avoidance is straightforward.  However, such a derating may require use of less efficient and 
larger components, which could pose challenges for SmallSats.  More important, the discovery 
of this new failure mechanism demonstrates the importance of SmallSat builders remaining 
current with developments in SEE HA.  We detail this and other recommendations below. 
9.3 Improving SEE HA for SmallSats… and For All Sats 
Although some of the challenges facing SmallSat SEE HA are unique—e.g. the emphasis on 
schedule, low budgets for SEE testing—many are common to any mission seeking to capitalize 
on the performance conferred by COTS.  As such, development of more SmallSat friendly 
approaches to SEE HA could have benefits far beyond those platforms.  Below, we sketch out 
some possible suggestions for the SmallSat approaches discussed in Section 8.   
1) Buy-it-and-fly-it—Although the name suggests a cavalier attitude toward SEE HA and 
indeed toward reliability in general, using COTS as is can be implemented to achieve 
increasing reliability over time.  However, for this to occur the overall SmallSat must be 
sufficiently reliable that root cause of failure can be determined.  This suggests that a 
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hybrid approach could be useful—a basic, reliable architecture supervising commercial 
hardware that supplies the needed performance.  Chances of success could be improved if 
diverse redundancy of the commercial hardware could be used for critical systems, 
although this is costly in scarce board space and system complexity.  In general, the 
better one understands the hardware being flown, the less likely one is to be surprised by 
error/failure modes that could occur on orbit.  For instance, if one is able to fly two 
different programmable radios, it is essential that the components inside the radios be 
assessed to ensure that critical functions are fulfilled by different components so that 
common failure modes can be avoided.   
2) Shelter from the Swarm—Swarm missions are one type of mission where diverse 
redundancy could be both a realistic and helpful mitigation, because the diversity could 
be implemented over the entire swarm without taking up valuable board space in 
individual satellites.  Such a scheme would require additional development, integration 
and testing, which would be a strain for a small team.  However, skillfully implementing 
diverse systems across the constellation of satellites and monitoring differential 
success/survival rates could allow the project could select the most reliable combinations 
and improve reliability over time.  This would be of great value not just for SmallSats, 
but for conventional builders as well. 
3) Don’t Get Board—Although board-level testing can save on test costs, it means giving up 
a lot of information about device performance and a lot of generality in understanding 
how a given device on the board would perform in another system.  Also, unless one is 
willing to test many boards/boxes, any significant amount of part-to-part variability in 
any of the parts on the board could invalidate the test results as predictors of on-orbit 
performance.  Nonetheless, there are suggestions that could improve results.  One key to 
better proton testing is ensuring that complex parts receive adequate coverage.  This 
might be achieved by supplementing an initial, low-fluence board test with high-fluence 
tests of complex, deep-submicron parts that require higher fluences to yield 
representative error/failure mode samples.  The rastering capabilities of proton 
accelerators at many of the medical facilities would be well suited to delivering such 
focused proton exposures. 
Moreover, the excellent penetration of proton beams means that one can test multiple 
boards back to back.  Not only does this increase the total fluence to which the test boards 
are exposed, it also can alert the tester to any serious variability from one test board to the 
next that might render the tests unrepresentative of flight boards.   
4) Although partnering SmallSat producers with producers of conventional satellites has the 
potential to benefit both parties, the strategy has yet to be exploited to any significant 
degree.  Most such collaborations have been between one arm of an organization that 
builds conventional satellites and another arm that builds or is seeking to start building 
SmallSats. However, as the success of the Cibola collaboration shows, such partnerships 
can be beneficial to both parties and to the radiation community generally.  
Risk-informed testing is another promising approach.  In some ways, this approach is not new.  
The SEE Criticality Approach proposed by NASA in the 1990s also advocated prioritizing 
testing by the criticality of the application.[36]  However, the issue here is that the resources for 
testing are more limited, and the options considered for reducing risk bounds are more diverse.   
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9.4 Final Thoughts 
As one would expect of a discipline tasked with managing risk for components that change at an 
exponential rate, SEE hardness assurance has always been dynamic.  The current challenges 
posed by a new, more complicated technologies, new mission platforms and ever tightening 
budgets seem daunting until we remember that when SEE were discovered, the community had 
no idea how to assess part susceptibilities, estimate rates or how the threat would evolve.  The 
path we have trod sheds light and provides perspective on the path we are treading.   
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ADC—Analog to Digital Converter 
ADI—Analog Devices, Incorporated 
AU—Astronomical Unit 
BJT—Bipolar Junction Transistor 
CAD—Computer Aided Design 
CFE—Cibola Flight Experiment 
CME—Coronal Mass Ejection 
CMOS—Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor 
COTS—Commercial Off The Shelf 
DDR—Double-Data Rate 
DRAM—Dynamic Random Access Memory 
DSEE—Destructive Single-Event Effect 
ECC—Error Correction Code 
EDAC—Error Detection and Correction 
FET—Field Effect Transistor 
FOM—Figure of Merit 
FMECA—Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
FPGA—Field Programmable Gate Array 
GCR—Galactic Cosmic Ray 
GEO—Geostationary Equatorial Orbit 
GLM—Generalized Linear Model 
GSN—Global Structured Network 
IRPP—Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped 
ISS—International Space Station 
IEEE—Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
LET—Linear Energy Transfer 
LETEQ—Equivalent Linear Energy Transfer 
MBU—Multibit upset 
MCU—Multi-cell upset 
MEO—Medium Earth Orbit 
MOSFET-- Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor 
NSREC—Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference 
REDW—Radiation Effects Data Workshop 
SCR—Silicon Controlled Register 
SDRAM—Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory 
SEC—Single-Error Correct 
SECDED—Single-Error Correct, Double-Error Detect 
SEE—Single-Event Effect 
SEB—Single-Event Burnout 
SEDR—Single-Event Dielectric Rupture 
SEEHA—SEE Hardness Assurance 
SEFI—Single-Event Functional Interrupt 
SEGR—Single-event gate rupture 
SEL—Single-Event Latchup 
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SESB—Single-event Stuck Bit 
SET—Single-Event Transient 
SEU—Single-Event Upset 
SIP—System In a Package 
SPE—Solar Particle Event 
SRAM—Static Random Access Memory 
SV—Sensitive Volume 
TNS—Transactons on Nuclear Science 
 
 
